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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The federal government’s various Indian policies create a 
number of boundaries across which Indian tribes must negotiate to 
ensure successful management of their natural resources. For example, 
the removal, reservation, and treaty-making period of the late 18th and 
early 19th Centuries created territorial boundaries that, for many tribes, 
did not align with their traditional homelands.1 Thereafter, allotment of 
many of the resulting tribal reservations decimated the tribal land base 
and left a checkerboard ownership pattern of land within many 
reservations.2 More recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court 
have limited tribal authority over the non-Indian owned squares on the 
checkerboard and correspondingly reduced tribal control over reservation 
land use and natural resources.3   
In addition to these geographic boundaries, Indian tribes must 
work across governmental boundaries, particularly those imposed by the 
trust relationship between tribes and the federal government.4 This 
relationship, rooted in the Supreme Court’s earliest Indian jurisprudence, 
impedes the free alienability of tribal land and resulted in the ownership 
of such land by the federal government in trust for Indian tribes.5 As 
federally-owned and managed lands, Indian lands are subject to federal 
oversight, which often requires federal approval of leases and other 
                                                 
1. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 1.03[6][a], 60-
64 (Nell Jessup Newton ed., 2012) [hereinafter COHEN’S HANDBOOK]. 
2. Id. § 1.04, 71-79. 
3. See, e.g., Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981) (limiting 
tribal authority over non-Indians on non-Indian fee lands subject to two exceptions); 
Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 
408 (1989) (limiting tribal authority over land use to lands largely closed to non-
Indians).   
4. COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at § 15.01-15.03, 994-99 (on 
trust status of land); Id. § 5.02-03, 391-405 (on federal authority over tribal trust 
land); Id. § 6.02[2][b], 507-11 (on limits of tribal authority over non-Indian owned 
land).  
5. See, e.g., Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823) (restricting 
alienability of Indian lands without consent of Federal Government); COHEN’S 
HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at §15.03, 997-99. 
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transactions affecting those lands.6 This federal role imports to Indian 
lands the requirements of other federal laws, such as the National 
Environmental Policy Act of 1964 (“NEPA”),7 and the additional 
burdens of federal administrative and regulatory procedures. Therefore, 
tribes must often transcend the federal-tribal boundary when seeking to 
successfully manage and develop natural resources on their own tribal 
lands. 
One of the most recent examples of the challenges presented by 
the federal-tribal relationship is an attempt by the Bureau of Land 
Management (“BLM” or “Agency”) to develop a uniform standard for 
the regulation of hydraulic fracturing, or “fracking,” across both federal 
and Indian lands.8 As part of the broader federal regulation of tribal 
lands, the BLM has long been responsible for authorizing drilling 
operations on Indian lands through the approval of an Application for 
Permit to Drill (“APD”).9 But, in late 2011, then-Secretary of the Interior 
Ken Salazar indicated that new rules were needed to update the Agency’s 
outdated regulatory scheme and account for new fracking technology, 
growing public concern over the practice, and potential safety concerns 
related to fracking.10 After nearly four and a half years of work, the BLM 
published its Final Rule regarding Hydraulic Fracturing on Federal and 
Indian Lands (“Final Rule”) on March 26, 2015.11  
                                                 
6. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 415(a) (2012). 
7. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370h (2012). 
8. The BLM’s rules apply to “Indian lands” subject to the provisions 
of the Act of 1909, 25 U.S.C. § 396 (2012), the Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938 
(“IMLA”), 25 U.S.C. §§ 396a-396g (2012), and the Indian Mineral Development 
Act of 1982 (“IMDA”), 25 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2107 (2012), which, subject to certain 
limited exceptions, includes lands held in trust by the Federal Government for Indian 
tribes or individual Indian allottees.  
9. Secretary of the Interior Jim Watt transferred authority over the 
“approval of drilling permits” to the BLM via an Amendment No. 1 to Secretarial 
Order 3087 on February 7, 1983. 48 Fed. Reg. 8,983 (Mar. 2, 1983). The BLM’s 
current regulations covering onshore oil and gas operations, including the issuance 
of APDs, are found at 43 C.F.R. pt. 3160 (2015). Those regulations apply to mineral 
leasing activities on Indian lands by virtue of the regulations of the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs (“BIA”), which incorporate them. 25 C.F.R. §§ 211.4, 225.4 (2015). 
10. Dave Cook, Interior Secretary: ‘Fracking’ can be Safe and 
Responsible, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR (Oct. 5, 2011), available at 
http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/monitor_breakfast/2011/1005/Interior-
secretary-Fracking-can-be-safe-and-responsible-VIDEO. 
11. Oil and Gas; Hydraulic Fracturing on Federal and Indian Lands; 
Final Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. 16,128 (Mar. 26, 2015). 
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The Final Rule added a number of procedural and substantive 
requirements for fracking operations to the BLM’s existing regulations 
and proposed to apply these standards uniformly to both federal public 
and Indian lands.12 According to the Final Rule, such uniformity was 
necessary to ensure Indian lands and communities “all receive the same 
level of protection as provided on public lands.”13 In response to 
concerns raised during the rulemaking process that such a uniform rule 
ignored tribal sovereignty, tribal self-determination, and the federal 
government’s trust responsibility to Indian tribes, the BLM expressed its 
view that providing Indian lands with the same substantive protections as 
federal public lands was consistent with the trust responsibility and that 
the rule promoted tribal sovereignty by “facilitating coordination.”14 
Furthermore, the Agency noted that the rule included a provision 
allowing a tribe to request a variance, but made clear that any such 
variance, if approved in the BLM’s discretion, would not “necessarily 
adopt tribal regulations as the Federal rule.”15 According to the BLM, 
“[b]y recognizing tribal regulations, [the Final Rule] accords with tribal 
self-determination to the extent that could be expected from a rule 
governing hydraulic fracturing operations.”16 
Given the ongoing debate over fracking and its potential 
environmental, health, and safety risks,17 the BLM’s attempt to regulate 
fracking on a national basis was sure to draw criticism and face 
challenges. In fact, within months of the Final Rule’s initial proposed 
effective date, United States District Judge Scott W. Skavdahl of the 
United States District Court for the District of Wyoming preliminarily 
enjoined the Rule from taking effect.18 Although interests both 
                                                 
12. Id. 
13. Id. 
14. Id. 
15. Id. 
16. Id. at 16,185.  
17. See, e.g., Jennifer A. Dlouhy, Clinton Doubles Down Against 
Fracking in Debate, Raising Alarms, BLOOMBERG BUSINESS (Mar. 7, 2016), 
available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-03-07/clinton-doubles-
down-against-fracking-in-debate-raising-alarms. 
18. Wyoming v. U.S. Dep’t. of the Interior, No. 2:15-cv-043-SWS, 
___F. Supp. 3d _____, 2015 WL 5845145 (D. Wyo. Sept. 30, 2015). The BLM 
intended for its Final Rule to take effect on June 24, 2015; however, in response to a 
lawsuit filed by a number of western states and an oil and gas industry association, 
and joined by one Indian tribe and a multitude of national environmental groups, the 
rule was temporarily enjoined by the United States District Court for the District of 
Wyoming pending the lodging of the administrative record and, on September 30th, 
2015, that court issued a fifty-four-page order preliminarily enjoining the Final Rule.  
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supporting and opposing fracking will continue to litigate the merits of 
the Final Rule, this article largely avoids the policy divide over fracking 
itself and instead critiques the Final Rule as it relates to tribal interests.19 
Viewed in this light, the BLM’s efforts marked a step back from the 
ongoing evolution of federal Indian policy, which since the mid-1970s 
has aimed to support greater tribal authority and self-governance, 
including in other areas of natural resource management.20 Rather than 
address tribal issues in accord with this more modern approach, the BLM 
instead chose to apply its statutory responsibilities for protecting public 
lands uniformly to both federal and Indian lands.21 In doing so, the BLM 
avoided meaningful tribal input on the rule, overlooked the specific 
congressional intent supporting its statutory authority to apply the Final 
Rule to Indian lands, and failed to fulfill the federal trust responsibility to 
Indian tribes in a manner that promotes tribal sovereignty. Because of 
these failures, this article suggests that the BLM modify the Final Rule to 
exempt Indian lands and work with tribes to develop a new approach that 
would be more consistent with the BLM’s statutory and trust 
responsibilities. 
This article begins by providing an orientation on the regulatory 
issues related to fracking with a particular focus on the unique regulatory 
structure of energy development on Indian lands. The second section 
provides a detailed overview of the development of the Final Rule and 
how the BLM treated tribal input during the Final Rule’s promulgation. 
Based on the issues raised by tribes throughout the rulemaking process, 
the article then analyzes the Final Rule in light of the BLM’s 
responsibility to consult with Indian tribes, the statutory authority on 
which the BLM relied to develop the Final Rule, and the federal trust 
responsibility. This analysis demonstrates the shortcomings of the Final 
Rule, particularly in light of how the federal government’s support for 
tribal sovereignty and self-determination has evolved in recent years. 
                                                 
19. See Michael Burger, The (Re)federalization of Fracking Regulation, 
2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1483 (2013) (“[t]he debate over who should regulate 
fracking—the federal government or the states—has followed a parallel track to the 
broader cultural debates, and the corresponding rhetorical alliances are well 
established. Those who envision private profit and the expansion of American power 
tend to favor state regulation. Those who fear environmental and public health risks, 
along with the perpetuation of the fossil fuel economy, tend to favor federal 
regulation.” Id. at 1486). 
20. See, e.g., National Indian Forest Resources Management Act, 25 
U.S.C. §§ 3101-3120 (2012). 
21. Oil and Gas; Hydraulic Fracturing on Federal and Indian Lands; 
Final Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. 16,128. 
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Based on these shortcomings, the article concludes that the BLM needs 
to reconsider the Final Rule as it applies to Indian lands and illustrates 
the need for federal agencies to recognize the boundary between federal 
and Indian lands in order to better promote tribal sovereignty and self-
determination. 
 
II.  FRACKING: RISKS AND REGULATIONS 
 
The recent proliferation of fracking as a technique for energy 
development has generated media, public, and scholarly attention.22 
Although Indian Country has already been the focus of some of this 
attention,23 the BLM’s Final Rule provides a new opportunity to analyze 
the balance of fracking’s risks, rewards, and regulation, particularly 
within the unique context of the federal-tribal relationship. This section 
provides some background on fracking, the federalism issues inherent in 
its regulation, and the current state of energy development oversight in 
Indian Country. 
 
A.  What is fracking? 
 
Hydraulic fracturing is the subterranean injection of fluids, 
including water, chemicals, and other materials, such as sand or silica, at 
high pressure to break up or increase the size and frequency of fractures 
in shale or other formations in an effort to release natural gas or oil from 
                                                 
22. See, e.g., recent motion pictures GASLAND (Trish Adlesic, Molly 
Gandour, Josh Fox, & David Roma, 2010); GASLAND PART II (Trish Adlesic, Josh 
Fox, & Deborah Wallace 2013); Clifford Krauss, Split Decision by Voters on Local 
Fracking Bans, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 5, 2014), available at http://www.nytimes.com 
/2014/11/06/business/energy-environment/split-decision-by-voters-on-local-fracking 
-bans-.html?_r=0; Thomas W. Merrill & David M. Schizer, The Shale Oil and Gas 
Revolution, Hydraulic Fracturing, and Water Contamination: A Regulatory 
Strategy, 98 MINN. L. REV. 145 (2013). 
23. See, e.g., Raymond Cross, Development’s Victim or its 
Beneficiary?: The Impact of Oil and Gas Development on the Fort Berthold Indian 
Reservation, 87 N.D. L. REV. 535 (2011); Mitchell Davis, Note, Fractured Focus: 
Tribal Energy Development and the Regulatory Contest Over Hydraulic Fracturing 
In Indian Country, 4 WASH. & LEE J. ENERGY, CLIMATE & ENV’T. 305 (2013); 
Szonja Ludvig, Comment, The Tribes Must Regulate: Jurisdictional, Environmental, 
and Religious Considerations of Hydraulic Fracturing on Tribal Lands, 2013 
B.Y.U. L. REV. 727 (2013); Kerstie B. Moran, The Bureau of Land Management’s 
Finalized Hydraulic Fracturing Rule on Tribal Lands: a Responsibility or 
Intrusion?, 39 AM. IND. L. REV. 585 (2016). 
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those formations.24 Although fracking has been used since the 1940s, 
more recent advances in technology and economic conditions, 
particularly over the last fifteen years, have significantly expanded its 
use and techniques.25 In fact, according to a 2013 report from the United 
States Department of Energy, the development of so-called 
unconventional natural gas, released from shale, “very low permeability 
sandstones,” or coal seams by fracturing those formations, is more 
prevalent than conventional gas development.26 While federal lands have 
seen similar development, the number of permits issued for proposed 
wells on those lands declined since a high of over 7,000 in fiscal year 
2007.27 Nonetheless, the BLM estimates that ninety percent of the 
approximately 2,800 new oil and gas wells started on federal and Indian 
lands in 2013 were fracked.28  
 
B.  Risks of Fracking 
 
The rapid expansion of fracking across many basins nationwide 
has prompted significant discussion and concern over the potential 
environmental impacts of the practice.29 Although the precise extent of 
                                                 
24. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL 
REQUESTORS: OIL AND GAS: INFORMATION ON SHALE RESOURCES, DEVELOPMENT, 
AND ENVIRONMENTAL AND PUBLIC HEALTH RISKS, GAO-12-732 9-13 (Sept. 2012), 
available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/650/ 
647791.pdf [hereinafter GAO-12-732]. 
25. Id. at 7, fig. 1; John M. Golden & Hannah J. Wiseman, The 
Fracking Revolution: Shale Gas as a Case Study in Innovation Policy, 64 EMORY L. 
J. 955, 968 (2015); Hannah Wiseman, Untested Waters: The Rise of Hydraulic 
Fracturing in Oil and Gas Production and the Need to Revisit Regulation, 20 
FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 115, 117-27 (2009). 
26. NAT’L ENERGY TECH. LAB., MODERN SHALE GAS DEVELOPMENT IN 
THE UNITED STATES: AN UPDATE 11 (Sept. 2013), available at https://www 
.netl.doe.gov/File%20Library/Research/Oil-Gas/shale-gas-primer-update-2013.pdf 
(unconventional gas accounted for sixty-five percent of U.S. natural gas production 
in 2013 and is expected to account for seventy-nine percent of production in 2040). 
27. BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., NUMBER OF DRILLING PERMITS 
APPROVED BY FISCAL YEAR ON FEDERAL LANDS (Oct. 29, 2014), available at 
http://www.blm.gov/style/medialib/blm/wo/MINERALS__REALTY__AND_RESO
URCE_PROTECTION_/energy/oil___gas_statistics/data_sets.Par.65795.File.dat/nu
mberofapdsapproved.pdf. 
28. 80 Fed. Reg. at 16,131. 
29. See generally, Wiseman, supra note 25, at 127-42; David B. 
Spence, Federalism, Regulatory Lags, and the Political Economy of Energy 
Production, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 431, 440-47 (2013); Michael Burger, Response, 
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these impacts is not clear,30 spills of both fracking fluids and produced 
water, as well as emissions from poorly constructed wells, have caused 
environmental damage.31 Thus, the BLM’s development of the Final 
Rule primarily focused on the potential for contamination of 
groundwater supplies, the storage and management of water both used by 
and flowing back as a result of fracking operations, and the use and 
disclosure of chemicals in the fracking process.32  
The potential for contamination through the underground 
migration of fracking fluids depends in large part upon the integrity of 
the well and the geology of the area, including the proximity of 
underground aquifers to formations targeted for development.33 The 
extent of risk posed by each of these conditions is uncertain for a number 
of reasons, although significant attention is being focused on resolving 
that uncertainty.34 For example, in 2011, the Environmental Protection 
Agency (“EPA”) developed a plan for studying the risks posed by 
fracking to groundwater, and in June 2015, released a draft of its 
                                                                                                             
Fracking and Federalism Choice, 161 U. PA. L. REV. Online 150 (2013) (responding 
to David Spence’s article). 
30. Spence, supra note 29, at 447 (“significant uncertainty remains 
regarding the magnitude and frequency of the negative effects of fracking. This 
uncertainty is reflected in the contrasting and evolving approaches taken by states in 
fracking regulations.”); GAO-12-732, supra note 24, at 4 (“[t]he risks identified in 
the studies and publications we reviewed cannot, at present, be quantified, and the 
magnitude of potential adverse effects or likelihood of occurrence cannot be 
determined for several reasons.”)   
31. See, e.g., Fracking on Federal Lands: Hearing on the Future of 
Hydraulic Fracturing on Federally Managed Lands: Hearing Before the Subcomm. 
on Energy and Mineral Res. of the H. Comm. on Natural Res., 114th Cong. ___ 
(July 15, 2015) (statement of Hannah J. Wiseman at 5-6), available at 
http://naturalresources.house.gov/uploadedfiles/ 
wisemantestimony.pdf (describing incidents and collecting sources). 
32. See, e.g., Oil and Gas; Well Stimulation, Including Hydraulic 
Fracturing, on Federal and Indian Lands, 77 Fed. Reg. 27,691 (May 11, 2012) 
(“[t]he extension of the practice has caused public concern about whether fracturing 
can allow or cause the contamination of underground water sources, whether the 
chemicals used in fracturing should be disclosed to the public, and whether there is 
adequate management of well integrity and the ‘flowback’ fluids that return to the 
surface during and after fracturing operations.”). 
33. GAO-12-732, supra note 24, at 46-49 (collecting studies and 
including a table showing the relative depth of fracking operations and groundwater 
supplies in the nation’s primary areas of development). 
34. See, e.g., Id. at 4, 49-50 (noting the lack of baseline data for 
comparison purposes, variations among business practices and regulatory schemes, 
and unique characteristics of each geologic region as factors contributing to 
uncertainty regarding these risks).  
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Assessment of the Potential Impacts of Hydraulic Fracturing of Oil and 
Gas on Drinking Water Resources for review by the EPA Science 
Advisory Board (“SAB”).35 The release of the draft Assessment for 
review by the SAB is the penultimate step before a final report of results, 
although it remains unclear when such a final report will be issued.36  
While the EPA report will be helpful in determining the level of 
risk, water supplies may still be contaminated through spills or leaks of 
water produced by or flowing back from fracking operations.37 
Mitigation of these risks depends upon the standards for management, 
storage, and reuse of produced and flowback water, which can be stored 
on-site in lined pits or tanks, reused in future operations, injected back 
into the sub-surface environment, or trucked away for treatment and 
disposal.38  
Concerns over water contamination are related to uncertainty 
surrounding the nature, extent, and toxicity of the chemicals used in the 
fracking process.39 Operators use a variety of components, along with 
copious amounts of water and proppants like sand and silica, in their 
fracking fluid and, depending upon the rules applicable to those 
operators, may not be required to disclose the contents of those 
components even if they are toxic or dangerous.40 In response to calls for 
                                                 
35. Notification of Teleconferences and a Public Meeting of the Science 
Advisory Board Hydraulic Fracturing Research Advisory Panel, 80 Fed. Reg. 32,111 
(June 5, 2015) (announcing release of the draft assessment to the EPA Science 
Advisory Board for review and input).  
36. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, STUDY OF THE POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF 
HYDRAULIC FRACTURING ON DRINKING WATER RESOURCES: PROGRESS REPORT: 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 4, (Dec. 2012), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/documents/hf-progress-report-exec-
summary20121214.pdf. 
37. GAO-12-732, supra note 24, at 40-44. 
38. Id. at 13; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REPORT TO THE 
RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY, HOUSE OF 
REPRESENTATIVES: ENERGY-WATER NEXUS: INFORMATION ON THE QUANTITY, 
QUALITY, AND MANAGEMENT OF WATER PRODUCED DURING OIL AND GAS 
PRODUCTION, GAO-12-156 14-15 (Jan. 2012), available at http://www.gao.gov/ 
assets/590/587522.pdf [hereinafter GAO-12-156]. 
39. See, e.g., Oil and Gas; Hydraulic Fracturing on Federal and Indian 
Lands; Final Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. 16,128 (“Rapid expansion of [fracking] and its 
complexity have caused public concern about whether fracturing can lead to or cause 
the contamination of underground water sources [and] whether the chemicals used in 
fracturing pose risks to human health.”) 
40. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, ANALYSIS OF HYDRAULIC FRACTURING 
FLUID DATA FROM THE FRACFOCUS CHEMICAL DISCLOSURE REGISTRY 1.0, 
  
 
10          PUBLIC LAND & RESOURCES LAW REVIEW              Vol. 37 
 
 
full disclosure of the chemicals used in fracking, some companies 
involved in fracking operations alleged that such disclosure would 
require them to release proprietary information and trade secrets.41 In 
addition to the chemicals used in fracking fluid, the water flowing back 
to the surface from fracking operations, called produced or flowback 
water, often contains naturally occurring contaminants that may also 
pose a threat to workers, public health, and the environment.42 
Although the BLM focused its rulemaking effort on these 
concerns over water contamination, either through spills and leaks or 
underground migration resulting from poorly constructed wellbores, and 
disclosure of the chemicals used in fracking, the practice may also pose 
risks to air quality, wildlife habitat, and the quantity of water supplies.43 
These potential risks and the ongoing expansion of fracking has 
prompted debate over how fracking should be regulated, particularly 
whether states or the federal government should be the primary regulator 
and how the appropriate government should develop its regulatory 
scheme.44   
 
C.  State versus Federal Regulation 
 
Although fracking presents a multitude of environmental risks, 
no single federal environmental law comprehensively addresses fracking 
or provides specific regulatory authority for fracking operations. Thus, 
Congress has not yet developed or expressly balanced federal fracking 
standards with state and tribal authority as in other environmental laws, 
such as the Clean Water Act (“CWA”), Clean Air Act (“CAA”), and the 
Safe Drinking Water Act (“SDWA”). These laws establish national 
                                                                                                             
EPA/601/R-14/003 17, 32 (Mar. 2015), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-03/documents/fracfocus_ 
analysis_report_and_appendices_final_032015_508_0.pdf (identifying 692 unique 
ingredients of fracking fluids based on disclosures from fracking operators to 
FracFocus database but noting that, for at least seventy percent of those disclosures, 
operators claimed the identity of at least one ingredient was confidential business 
information); GAO-12-732, supra note 24, at 12, fig. 3. 
41. John Craven, Note, Fracking Secrets: The Limitations of Trade 
Secret Protection in Hydraulic Fracturing, 16 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 395, 401-02 
(2014). 
42. GAO-12-156, supra note 38, at 12. 
43. GAO-12-732, supra note 24, at 39-52. 
44. See, e.g., Should the Federal Government Regulate Fracking?, 
WALL STREET JOURNAL (Apr. 14, 2013), available at 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323495104578314302738867078 
(including perspectives on each side of the debate). 
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policy and set minimum standards for air or water quality and allow 
states and tribes to apply to assume primary regulatory authority for 
establishing their own environmental standards, licensing, and 
enforcement arrangements.45  
While some fracking operations may be subject to air and water 
quality regulation under these federal laws, there is no oil and gas 
production or fracking-specific federal law or regulation.46 Until 2005, 
the SDWA arguably applied to fracking operations as it sought to ensure 
protection of drinking water from underground injections.47 In 
interpreting the SDWA, however, the EPA did not require that state 
programs authorized under the SDWA include regulation of fracking 
because the EPA did not believe that fracking wells were covered by the 
statute.48  This regulatory exemption was subsequently codified in the 
2005 Energy Policy Act, which specifically excluded “the underground 
injection of fluids or propping agents (other than diesel fuels) pursuant to 
hydraulic fracturing operations related to oil, gas, or geothermal 
production activities” from the definition of  “underground injection” for 
purposes of the SDWA’s application.49 As a result of the exemption, 
federal law does not require that the EPA, or a state or tribe exercising 
authority delegated from the EPA, issue a permit to authorize a fracking 
operation. 50  
                                                 
45. See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7601(d) (2012); Clean Water 
Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1377 (2012); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-11 (2012).  
46. Spence, supra note 29, at 447; GAO-12-732, supra note 24, at 13-
14. 
47. 42 U.S.C. § 300h(b)(1) (2012). 
48. Legal Envtl. Assistance Found., Inc. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 
118 F.3d 1467, 1471 (11th Cir. 1997). 
49. 42 U.S.C. § 300h(d)(1)(B)(ii). 
50. The application of other federal statutes of general applicability 
more specifically focused on environmental protection largely depend upon the 
specifics of a particular fracking operation. For example, depending upon how an 
operator wishes to dispose of wastewater, the disposal may be subject to the Clean 
Water Act (33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1274 (2012) (requiring a permit for discharge)) or the 
Safe Drinking Water Act (42 U.S.C. §300f (2012) (for reinjection)); see also U.S. 
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTORS: 
UNCONVENTIONAL OIL AND GAS DEVELOPMENT: KEY ENVIRONMENTAL AND PUBLIC 
HEALTH REQUIREMENTS, GAO-12-874 (Sept. 2012) [hereinafter GAO-12-874] 
(outlining requirements from eight federal environmental and public health laws 
applicable to fracking). Oil and gas operations enjoy exemptions from other federal 
environmental statutes, however. The disposal of oil and gas wastewater is not 
subject to the hazardous waste disposal requirements of the Resource Conservation 
and Recovery Act. 42 U.S.C. § 6921(b)(2)(A) (2012).   
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Currently, BLM must approve an APD before an operator can 
drill a well on federal or Indian lands.51 Although the information to be 
submitted with an APD primarily addresses potential surface impacts,52 
operators must also submit a drilling plan with technical information 
about the integrity of the proposed well.53 Aside from the well 
information submitted through the APD process, however, no 
overarching federal law specifically governs fracking operations, leaving 
comprehensive permitting and regulation of fracking largely a matter of 
state control.54 A great deal of debate has ensued as to whether state 
primacy or comprehensive federal permitting and regulation of fracking 
is the better regulatory approach.55  
A number of states have adopted comprehensive fracking 
regulatory regimes that vary both in types of regulation and activities 
regulated.56 In light of the exemption of fracking from the SDWA, and 
because no federal law specifically preempts application of state fracking 
regulations on federal lands,57 these states generally regulate oil and gas 
production on federal lands in conjunction with federal leasing statutes, 
such as the Mineral Leasing Act,58 and accompanying regulations, such 
as the BLM’s APD standards.59 The BLM’s Final Rule proposed to 
                                                 
51. 43 C.F.R. § 3162.3-1(c) (2012). 
52. Id. § 3162.3-1(d)(2), (f). 
53. Id. § 3162.3-1(d)(1), (e). 
54. Spence, supra note 29, at 447 (“[t]here is no comprehensive federal 
licensing regime for onshore oil and gas development. To the contrary, the 
regulation of oil and natural gas exploration and production in the United States has 
always been primarily a state matter.”) 
55. See, e.g., Id. (arguing against broad federal regulation and that 
ongoing “regulatory adjustment by states” and federal regulation under existing 
authority is an “appropriate response”); Wiseman, supra note 25 (suggesting that 
Congress consider reversing the 2005 exemption); Amanda C. Leiter, Fracking, 
Federalism, and Private Governance, 39 HARVARD ENVTL. L. REV. 107 (2015) 
(analyzing “governance gap” in fracking regulation and discussing whether gap can 
be filled by private interest group governance). 
56. GAO-12-874, supra note 50, at 48-50, table 4 (comparing 
requirements of six states); Wiseman, supra note 25, at 157-68; NATHAN 
RICHARDSON, MADELINE GOTTLIEB, ALAN KRUPNICK & HANNAH WISEMAN, THE 
STATE OF STATE SHALE GAS REGULATION (June 2013), available at 
http://www.rff.org/files/sharepoint/WorkImages/Download/RFF-Rpt-
StateofStateRegs_Report.pdf. 
57. Cf. Cal. Coastal Comm’n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572, 580-
81 (1987) (relying on Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 543 (1976)). 
58. 30 U.S.C. §§ 181-187b, 189-193, 195, 201-203, 205 to 208-1, 208, 
211-214, 223-226, 226-2, 226-3, 228-229a, 241, 251, 261-263 (2012). 
59. 43 C.F.R. pt. 3160 (2015). 
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incorporate additional federal standards for fracking into these 
regulations, some of which would conflict with and thereby preempt 
existing state standards.60 
The conflict between the Final Rule and state authority is similar 
to the conflicts between states and local governments over localized bans 
on fracking. In 2014, the New York State Court of Appeals, New York’s 
highest court, upheld a municipal ban on fracking in light of the 
municipality’s authority to control land use planning and zoning.61 In 
doing so, the court noted that the matter was not dependent upon the 
policy issues related to fracking, but instead depended upon the 
“relationship between the State and its local government subdivisions.”62 
Similarly, the City of Longmont, Colorado, amended its charter to enact 
a similar ban in light of the risks fracking posed to “public health and 
safety, property[,] . . . air quality, . . . landscape[, and] drinking and 
surface water.”63 Colorado’s Oil and Gas Association and Oil and Gas 
Conservation Commission challenged Longmont’s ban, arguing that the 
City’s authority was preempted by state law, which authorized the 
Conservation Commission to “regulate oil and gas activity in the state.”64 
Because Longmont’s ban could not be “harmonized” with the state’s 
more production-oriented goals, the trial court granted summary 
judgment to the state plaintiffs but stayed an injunction against the ban to 
allow for appeal.65 Similar conflicts between state and local governments 
and their respective authorities and interests have proceeded elsewhere.66  
Although the potential for federal-state regulatory conflicts and 
these intrastate disputes over fracking depend upon the approach of each 
state and municipality, they highlight the distinction between the 
                                                 
60. 80 Fed. Reg. at 16,128 (noting age of existing regulations); Id. at 
16,130 (listing states with existing hydraulic fracturing regulations in place). 
61. Wallach v. Town of Dryden, 16 N.E. 3d 1188 (N.Y. 2014). 
62. Id. at 1202. 
63. CITY OF LONGMONT, COLO., CODE OF ORDINANCES, pt. 1, art. XVI, 
§ 16.2 (through Jan. 12, 2016), https://www.municode.com/library/co/ 
longmont/codes/code_of_ordinances?nodeId=PTICH_ARTXVILOPUHESAWEAC.  
64. Colo. Oil and Gas Ass’n v. City of Longmont, No. 13CV63, 2014 
WL 3690665, at *7-8 (Colo. Dist. Ct. July 24, 2014) (order granting mots. for summ. 
j.). 
65. Id. at *14. Just as this article was going to publication, the Colorado 
Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s ruling, holding that the local 
government’s fracking ban “materially impedes the application of state law” and is 
therefore preempted. City of Longmont v. Colo. Oil and Gas Ass’n, No. 15SC667, 
___ P.3d ___, 2016 WL 1757509, at *10 (Colo. May 2, 2016). 
66. See Uma Outka, Intrastate Preemption in the Shifting Energy 
Sector, 86 U. COLO. L. REV. 927, 954-76 (2015). 
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interests of local residents and the broader policies of a larger 
government. This distinction is particularly relevant in the tribal context, 
where tribal governments face “quantitatively and qualitatively different 
risks and impacts from oil and gas development,” including risks to tribal 
homelands and culturally significant sites, as well as an entirely different 
demand for sustained economic development, as compared to their 
municipal, state, and federal counterparts.67 The oversight of fracking 
thus poses different challenges for Indian tribes. Unlike lands regulated 
by states, municipalities, and the public lands managed by the federal 
government, tribal land offers connections to innumerable prior 
generations and cultural values that have existed since time immemorial. 
Many tribes must balance these connections with the potential for 
developing their natural resources into significant and much-needed 
economic benefits. Beyond distinctions between the nature of tribal lands 
and those maintained for state, local, federal, or public purposes, the trust 
relationship between the federal government and Indian tribes, 
particularly as it relates to the federal government’s regulation of tribal 
resources, also sets Indian lands apart. 
 
III.  ENERGY DEVELOPMENT IN INDIAN COUNTRY 
 
The regulatory environment for energy leasing and development 
in Indian Country is the product of the unique relationship between the 
federal government and tribal nations and, therefore, poses different 
issues than intrastate conflicts or the divide between support for either 
state or federal regulation of fracking. Instead, the federal-tribal 
relationship is based on the federal government’s trust responsibility 
toward tribes and their lands and the Indian-specific statutory and 
regulatory schemes developed as a result of that relationship. 
 
A.  Trust Relationship 
  
The federal government’s trust responsibility to Indian tribes is 
rooted in federal treaties, laws and policies, and decisions of the Supreme 
Court that date to the earliest days of the republic. The widely accepted 
genesis of the notion of a trust relationship is Supreme Court Chief 
Justice John Marshall’s description of the relationship between tribes and 
the young federal government as that of a “ward to his guardian.”68 Chief 
Justice Marshall based his conception of the trust relationship on the 
                                                 
67. Cross, supra note 23, at 538.  
68. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831). 
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history of the relationship between native peoples and the colonizing 
forces of Europe and, later, the United States federal government, and 
relied in large part upon the interpretation of the treaties entered into on a 
government-to-government basis between those nations.69 In its earliest 
conceptions, the federal government’s trust responsibilities manifested in 
restraints on the alienation of tribal property without oversight and 
approval by the federal government, and the federal protection of 
inherent tribal authority within tribal lands through the exclusion of state 
authority by the federal-tribal relationship.70 The trust responsibility is 
foundational in federal Indian law and policy,  particularly regarding 
federal management of Indian lands.71 As a product of that responsibility, 
the statutes governing the leasing and development of mineral resources 
on tribal lands mandate significant federal oversight of those processes 
and generally require federal approval of any mineral lease or 
agreement.72 In order to implement this statutory oversight, the Secretary 
of the Interior (“Secretary”) was granted broad authority for 
promulgating regulations, which have come to largely define the nature 
of energy development on Indian lands.73  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
69. Id. (reviewing Treaty of Hopewell, 7 Stat. 18, Nov. 28, 1785, 
available at http://www.cherokee.org/AboutTheNation/History/Facts/Treatyof Hope 
well,1785.asp); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832) (examining history of 
British claims to America and treaties with the Cherokee Nation entered into by both 
Great Britain and the United States to exclude application of Georgia’s laws within 
the Cherokee’s territory). 
70. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543; Worcester, 31 U.S. at 561 (“The Cherokee 
nation, then, is a distinct community occupying its own territory, with boundaries 
accurately described, in which the laws of Georgia can have no force, and which the 
citizens of Georgia have no right to enter, but with the assent of the Cherokees 
themselves, or in conformity with treaties, and with the acts of congress. The whole 
intercourse between the United States and this nation, is, by our constitution and 
laws, vested in the government of the United States.”) 
71. COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at § 5.04[3], 412-16. 
72. See, e.g., the Indian Mineral Leasing Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 396a-396g 
(2012) (requiring Secretarial approval of mineral leases on Indian lands).  
73. While the following provides a brief summary, Professor Judith 
Royster provides much more detail in her comprehensive overview of the evolution 
of the federal-tribal relationship with regard to mineral development. Judith Royster, 
Mineral Development in Indian Country: The Evolution of Tribal Control over 
Mineral Resources, 29 TULSA L. J. 541 (1994). 
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B.  Federal Oversight of Energy Development 
 
The first comprehensive federal statute governing mineral 
development in Indian Country was the 1938 Indian Mineral Leasing Act 
(“IMLA”).74 The IMLA authorized the leasing of unallotted lands within 
a reservation or lands owned by a tribe under federal jurisdiction, subject 
to the approval of the Secretary.75 The IMLA also set forth general 
procedures for the public auction of such leases,76 required lessees to 
furnish performance bonds,77 and authorized the Secretary to promulgate 
rules and regulations to cover “all operations” under any lease approved 
pursuant to the IMLA.78 The IMLA was intended to provide a measure of 
uniformity to what had previously been a mix of leasing laws applicable 
to Indian Country while also promoting tribal governmental authority by 
requiring tribal consent for each lease authorized under the IMLA,79 and 
ensuring that the Secretary maximize returns to tribes from development 
of their resources.80  
Nearly fifty years later, largely in response to concerns from 
tribes over the inflexibility of the IMLA’s leasing regime, Congress 
enacted the Indian Mineral Development Act (“IMDA”).81 Unlike the 
IMLA, which offered no option beyond the lease of tribal minerals, the 
IMDA allowed tribes to negotiate and enter a variety of arrangements for 
mineral development, including a “joint venture, operating, production 
sharing, service, managerial, lease[,] or other agreement.”82 The IMDA 
still mandated approval by the Secretary and required the Secretary to 
promulgate rules and regulations to implement the IMDA within 180 
days of the law’s enactment.83 To ensure tribes had a role in the 
development of the regulations, Congress required the Secretary to 
                                                 
74. 25 U.S.C. §§ 396a-396g. 
75. 25 U.S.C.  § 396a. Originally, the IMLA’s leasing provisions did 
not apply to “the Crow Reservation in Montana, the ceded lands of the Shoshone 
Reservation in Wyoming, the Osage Reservation in Oklahoma, [or] to the coal and 
asphalt lands of the Choctaw and Chickasaw Tribes in Oklahoma.” 25 U.S.C. § 396f. 
Congress subsequently removed the exception for the Crow Reservation. Crow Tribe 
of Indians v. Montana, 650 F. 2d 1104, 1111, n.6 (9th Cir. 1981). 
76. 25 U.S.C. § 396b.  
77. 25 U.S.C. § 396c. 
78. 25 U.S.C. § 396d. 
79. 25 U.S.C. § 396a. 
80. See Crow Tribe, 650 F. 2d at 1112-13 (describing Congressional 
intent of the IMLA).  
81. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2108 (2012). 
82. 25 U.S.C. § 2102(a). 
83. 25 U.S.C. § 2107. 
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“consult with national and regional Indian organizations and tribes with 
expertise in mineral development both in the initial formulation of [the 
regulations] and [in] any future revision or amendment.”84 
In an effort to fulfill Congress’ directive to ensure tribal input, 
the Secretary circulated a draft set of regulations to tribes, national tribal 
organizations, and tribal attorneys for comment, and incorporated “many 
of the[ir] suggestions” before even opening the public comment period 
on the proposed regulations.85 Comments from tribes and tribal 
organizations were also submitted and considered during the public 
comment period.86 Then, although the regulations had been published as 
a final version, the Secretary, citing “uncertainty expressed by Indian 
interests and industry on numerous issues,” determined that the 
regulations needed to be entirely “reformatted and revised” to separate 
the regulations relevant to IMLA from those implementing IMDA.87 In 
doing so, the drafters sought “to ensure that Indian mineral owners and 
Indian mineral lessees ha[d] a full opportunity to review and comment.” 
So, the regulations were published as draft, not final, and meetings were 
scheduled to discuss the draft.88 Additional comment was also sought on 
the separate IMLA regulations “in order to address comments expressed 
by tribal representatives” and others.89  Ultimately, the final IMDA 
regulations were adopted in 1994.90 In 1996, the Department of the 
Interior (“DOI” or the “Department”) adopted new IMLA regulations.91 
Thus, in accordance with the IMDA’s requirement that the Secretary 
seek and obtain tribal input in promulgating regulations, the Secretary 
relied upon consultation with and input from tribes throughout the 
development of regulations for both IMLA and IMDA. In fact, it was 
                                                 
84. Id. 
85. Mining Regulations, Proposed Rule, 48 Fed. Reg. 31,978 (July 12, 
1983). 
86. Contracts for Prospecting and Mining on Indian Lands; Oil and Gas 
and Geothermal Contracts, Final Rule, 52 Fed. Reg. 31,916 (Aug. 24, 1987). 
87. Leasing of Tribal Lands for Mineral Development, Leasing of 
Allotted Lands for Mineral Development, and Oil and Gas, Geothermal and Solid 
Mineral Agreements, Proposed Rule, 56 Fed. Reg. 58,734 (Nov. 21, 1991). 
88. Id. at 58,735. 
89. Leasing of Tribal Lands for Mineral Development; Leasing of 
Allotted Lands for Mineral Development, 57 Fed. Reg. 40,298 (Sept. 2, 1992). 
90. Oil and Gas, Solid Mineral, and Geothermal Minerals Agreements, 
59 Fed. Reg. 14,960 (Mar. 30, 1994). 
91. Leasing of Tribal Lands for Mineral Development and Leasing of 
Allotted Lands for Mineral Development, Final Rule, 61 Fed. Reg. 35,634 (July 8, 
1996). 
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largely tribal input that resulted in the separation of the IMLA from the 
IMDA regulations, which clarified each as a distinct regulatory scheme.92 
Both the IMLA and the IMDA regulations incorporated the 
BLM’s regulations governing onshore oil and gas development and 
applied them to IMLA and IMDA leases.93 One justification for doing so, 
as set forth in the publication of the final IMLA regulations, was that 
“[a]ppropriate consistency [between the mineral leasing and 
development of Indian and federal lands] is desirable because many of 
the operating and reclamation regulations of other offices and bureaus of 
the Department [ ] are also applicable in the day-to-day management of” 
Indian lands.94 That justification failed to note, however, that the 
regulations of other DOI agencies and bureaus, like the BLM, were 
applied to Indian lands solely through adoption of the Department’s own 
regulations. Even then, the publication of the final IMLA regulations 
went on to recognize that “in a number of important respects mineral 
leasing and development on Indian lands differ from such activities on 
Federal lands.”95  
                                                 
92. Id. at 35,635 (restating that the expression of uncertainty by Indian 
interests and industry supported the reformatting and revision); see 25 C.F.R. pt. 211 
(2016) (for IMLA); 25 C.F.R. pt. 225 (2016) (for IMDA). In 1982, the BLM 
assumed responsibility for certain oversight and approval functions on federal lands 
from the United States Geological Survey and the Mineral Management Service 
(“MMS”). 48 Fed. Reg. 8,983 (Mar. 2, 1983). At the time, Secretary Jim Watt also 
transferred the MMS’s responsibilities over such functions on Indian lands to the 
BIA. Id. (“Those functions now performed by the MMS which are being transferred 
to the BLM will, in the case of their application to Indian lands, be similarly 
transferred from the MMS to the Bureau of Indian Affairs.” Id.). Just over a month 
later, Secretary Watt amended that Order to consolidate the BLM’s authority over 
both federal and Indian lands. Id.; see also DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, DEPARTMENT 
MANUAL 235 DM 1, 1.1.K (Oct. 5, 2009), available at 
http://elips.doi.gov/elips/0/fol/884/Row1.aspx (“[t]he [BLM] Director . . . may 
exercise the authority of the Assistant Secretary – Land and Minerals Management 
for administering operations on oil and gas, geothermal, and other mineral leases on 
Federal and Indian lands under . . . the [IMLA] (25 U.S.C. 396a) . . . and other 
authorities under which the [BLM] issues mineral leases.”) 
93. 25 C.F.R. §§ 211.4, 225.4. 
94. 61 Fed. Reg. at 35,638. 
95. Id. at 35,638-39. In fact, Interior’s efforts to revise the IMLA 
regulations arose from a recognition by then-Secretary Rogers C.B. Morton that a 
revision was needed in order to “better fulfill [his] future trust responsibility to 
assure the protection of Indian culture and environmental interests as well as to 
allow maximum development of Indian natural resources.” TEXT OF DECISION ON 
NORTHERN CHEYENNE PETITION 3, in OFFICE OF THE SEC’Y, DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, 
NEWS RELEASE: MORTON ANNOUNCES DECISION OF NORTHERN CHEYENNE COAL 
LANDS (June 4, 1974), available at http://www.bia.gov/cs/groups/public/documents/ 
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Federal oversight and approval of IMLA and IMDA agreements 
implicates other federal standards beyond the regulations of other 
Interior offices and bureaus as well. For example, before taking action to 
approve a lease or agreement on Indian lands, NEPA requires the 
Secretary to analyze the potential environmental impacts of such 
actions.96 The Secretary must also ensure compliance with various 
federal cultural protection laws.97 
The equal application of federal law and regulations to both 
federal and Indian lands and the involvement of various federal bureaus 
and agencies in the management of Indian lands has resulted in what a 
recent Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) report described as a 
“framework [that] can involve significantly more steps than the 
development of private and state resources, increase development costs, 
and add to the timeline for development.”98 That report also noted the 
sentiment among many stakeholders that development in Indian Country 
“is generally not managed according to tribal priorities and does not 
reflect that Indian lands are intended for the use and benefit of Indian 
tribes and their members,” but are instead “being managed according to 
priorities generally associated with public lands.”99  
Therefore, although it was considered “appropriate” to apply the 
BLM’s operating regulations equally to both federal and Indian lands 
when the final IMLA and IMDA regulations were developed in the mid-
1990s, the result is a regulatory environment that manages Indian lands 
according to public, not tribal, priorities. In addition, the federal 
bureaucracy administering those laws and regulations imposes 
                                                                                                             
text/idc-022233.pdf. In publishing the first draft of those revised regulations, the 
Department noted that it had delayed a concurrent effort to develop regulations 
regarding coal mining to exclude Indian-owned coal from rules applicable to federal 
lands. Mining on Indian Lands: Mineral Development Contracts, Proposed Rules, 42 
Fed. Reg. 18,083 (Mar. 30, 1977).  Then-Secretary Kleppe’s reasoning for doing so 
was “based upon the conclusion that considerations governing the administration of 
Indian-owned resources are different from those involved in administering the public 
estate” and that the regulations as they applied to federal lands “could not be married 
to the Department’s legal relationship with Indian tribes.” Id.  
96. 25 C.F.R. §§ 211.7, 225.24. 
97. See 25 C.F.R. pt. 211 (for IMLA); 25 C.F.R. pt. 225 (for IMDA). 
98. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN, 
COMMITTEE ON INDIAN AFFAIRS, U.S. SENATE: INDIAN ENERGY DEVELOPMENT: 
POOR MANAGEMENT BY BIA HAS HINDERED ENERGY DEVELOPMENT, GAO-15-502, 
24-25 (June 2015), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/ 
670701.pdf [hereinafter GAO-15-502].  
99. Id. at 25. 
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significant delays and costs on the development of Indian lands.100 
Although tribes expressed concern during the development of the Final 
Rule that its requirements would add even more costs and delays to these 
existing regulatory challenges, the BLM instead maintained a consistent 
focus on the need for uniformity between the regulation of federal and 
Indian lands.   
 
C.  Tribal Regulation 
 
In recognition of their unique interests in Indian lands, a number 
of tribes have sought to assume greater control over the regulation of 
environmental concerns on their reservations.101 Although Indian tribes 
retain inherent sovereign authority to do so, their ability to regulate the 
conduct of non-Indians on their reservations is limited and, therefore, 
tribes have also sought the delegation of federal authority through so-
called Treatment as State provisions of various federal environmental 
statutes, such as the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts.102 As a result of the 
2005 amendment to the SDWA described above, the EPA does not have 
any federal authority to delegate to tribes to regulate fracking but, just 
like their state and local government counterparts, some tribes have 
adopted laws and regulations related to fracking operations in lieu of a 
broader federal regulatory scheme.103  
                                                 
100. Id. (citing one estimate that the development of Indian lands costs 
approximately sixty-five percent more than development of other lands not subject 
to the same regulatory framework).  
101. See, e.g., Elizabeth Ann Kronk Warner, Examining Tribal 
Environmental Law, 39 COLUM. J. ENVTL. LAW 42, 63-94 (2014) (surveying 
environmental laws from seventy-four tribes in Arizona, Montana, New York and 
Oklahoma). 
102. Id. at 53-59 (describing inherent tribal authority and delegation of 
Federal authority for the development of tribal environmental laws); Elizabeth Ann 
Kronk Warner, Tribes as Innovative Environmental ‘Laboratories’, 86 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 789, 809-11 (surveying tribes with TAS status under various statutes).  
103. See, e.g., MHA Energy Division Resolutions, MHA ENERGY, 
http://www.mhanation.com/main2/departments/mha_energy_division/mhaenergydiv
ision_resolutions.html (last visited Dec. 28, 2015) (compiling various tribal 
resolutions related to energy development on MHA Nation lands); ASSINIBOINE AND 
SIOUX TRIBES OF THE FORT PECK RESERVATION, FORT PECK TRIBES COMPREHENSIVE 
CODE OF JUSTICE, title 22, ch. 2, available at 
http://www.fptc.org/ccoj/title_22/chapters/chapter2.pdf (last visited Feb. 23, 2016) 
(requiring a tribal permit for underground injection activities, in conjunction with 
tribe’s TAS authority under SDWA); S. UTE INDIAN TRIBE, RESOLUTION NO. 2015-
98 (June 16, 2015), available at http://www.suitdoe.com/Documents/ 
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The BLM waded into this regulatory environment when 
promulgating its Final Rule. This article next provides a detailed review 
of the Agency’s rulemaking process, with particular focus on the issues 
raised by tribes in light of the initial and revised proposed versions and 
BLM’s Final Rule. 
 
IV.  THE BLM’S FRACKING RULE 
 
Although it was issued in March 2015, work on the BLM’s Final 
Rule began as early as November 2010 when then-Secretary Ken Salazar 
hosted a public forum on hydraulic fracturing.104 In kicking off that 
forum, Secretary Salazar focused on the need for greater disclosure of the 
components used in fracking fluids and described the Department’s 
objective as seeking to “reassure the American public that what we are 
doing is in fact safe and is in fact protective of the environment.”105 At 
that time, Secretary Salazar and officials within the DOI were focused on 
the development of natural gas reserves in the context of national energy 
policy and, aside from considering requirements for disclosure of 
fracking chemicals, were not clearly committed to a broad approach to 
regulating fracking.106 Importantly, although the forum that began 
discussion and consideration of what became the Final Rule included 
input from various industry and State regulatory participants, no tribal 
representatives participated as panelists.107 In addition, while the forum 
discussed the interaction of then-current BLM rules with the state 
                                                                                                             
HydraulicFracturingRegulations.pdf, adopting S. UTE INDIAN TRIBE, HYDRAULIC 
FRACTURING AND CHEMICAL DISCLOSURE REGULATIONS (June 16, 2015), available 
at http://www.suitdoe.com/Documents/ HydraulicFracturingRegulations.pdf 
(adopting tribal regulations governing fracking operations on the reservation in 
response to the BLM’s Final Rule).  
104. Bureau of Land Management’s Final Hydraulic Fracturing Rule, 
114th Cong. ___ (statement of Neil Kornze, Dir., Bureau of Land Mgmt., at 2-3), 
available at http://naturalresources.house.gov/uploadedfiles/ 
kornzetestimony.pdf; U.S. DEPT. OF THE INTERIOR, Press Release: Salazar Holds 
Forum to Examine Best Practices for Hydraulic Fracturing in Oil and Gas 
Production (Nov. 30, 2010), available at https://www.doi.gov/news/ 
pressreleases/Salazar-Holds-Forum-to-Examine-Best-Practices-for-Hydraulic-
Fracturing-in-Oil-and-Natural-Gas- Production.  
105. DEPT. OF THE INTERIOR, NWX-DEPT OF INTERIOR-NBC 4 (Nov. 30, 
2010) (transcript from November 30, 3010 Fracking Forum), available at 
https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/migrated/news/pressreleases/upload/Fracking
_Forum_2011-11-30_Transcript.pdf. 
106. Id. at 3-4 (comments of Secretary Salazar). 
107. Id. at 12-14, 52-54 (introducing panelists). 
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regulatory schemes of Wyoming and New Mexico, there was no mention 
of how the BLM rules might interact with Indian Country.108  
 
A.  Initial Proposed Rule 
 
Following the initial public forum, the BLM held forums in 
North Dakota, Arkansas, and Colorado throughout April 2011 to gather 
additional public input regarding its intent to address concerns over 
fracking.109 Unlike the engagement of tribes in drafting the initial IMLA 
and IMDA regulations,110 it was not until after these forums and just over 
a year after Secretary Salazar convened the initial public forum that the 
BLM sought to engage in any tribal consultation about fracking or 
potential rulemaking.111 These initial tribal consultation meetings began 
in January 2012; however, according to the BLM, the initial proposed 
rule had already been drafted by that time.112 Rather than engage and 
involve tribes in discussion of whether any rule was necessary and, if so, 
how it could address issues of importance to the tribes or incorporate 
tribal comments into an initial draft, the BLM instead sought 
consultation with tribes about how a BLM rule may “affect Indian 
activities, practices, or beliefs if it were to be applied to particular 
locations on Indian . . . lands.”113 This approach prompted significant 
                                                 
108. Id. at 63-82.  
109. 80 Fed. Reg. at 16,131. The Final Rule also mentions 2011 
recommendations from the Natural Gas Subcommittee of the Secretary of Energy’s 
Advisory Board “that the BLM undertake a rulemaking to ensure well integrity, 
water protection, and adequate public disclosure”; however, review of the initial 90-
day and final reports of that Subcommittee do not demonstrate such specific 
recommendations. Improving the Safety & Environmental Performance of Hydraulic 
Fracturing, NATURAL GAS SUBCOMM. OF THE SEC’Y OF ENERGY ADVISORY BD., 
SAFETY OF SHALE GAS DEV. (Dec. 9, 2011), http://www.shalegas.energy.gov. 
110. See supra Section III.B.  
111. 80 Fed. Reg. at 16,132 (describing four regional tribal consultation 
meetings but also noting that “[t]he BLM distributed copies of a draft rule to affected 
federally recognized tribes in January 2012.”) 
112. Id. The Opening Brief for the Federal Appellants filed in the appeal 
of the injunction issued by Judge Skavdahl pending before the United States Circuit 
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit also suggests that the rule was already 
drafted, but not published, before any tribal consultation took place. Opening Br. for 
the Fed. Appellants at 49, Wyoming v. Jewell, (10th Cir. filed Mar. 21, 2016) (No. 
15-8126). 
113. Impacts of the Bureau of Land Management’s Hydraulic Fracturing 
Rule on Indian Tribal Energy Development: Oversight Hearing before the 
Subcomm. on Indian and Alaska Native Aff. of the H. Comm. on Natural Res., Serial 
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concern from tribal leaders, some of whom expressed extreme frustration 
that it appeared the BLM had drafted its proposed rule and prepared it for 
publication before even notifying tribes.114 Such concerns were 
particularly pointed in light of a Tribal Consultation Policy adopted by 
the DOI only a month beforehand.115  
Undeterred by tribal concerns with the substance of its 
consultation process (or lack thereof), the BLM forged ahead and 
published its initial proposed rule in the Federal Register in May 2012.116 
The purported need for the rule in its initial form largely tracked the 
concerns raised by Secretary Salazar nearly a year and a half earlier, with 
the rule’s summary stating, it “is necessary to provide useful information 
to the public and to assure that hydraulic fracturing is conducted in a way 
that adequately protects the environment.”117 As further justification, the 
commentary on the initial proposed rule emphasized the outdated nature 
of the BLM’s existing regulations, reviewed the quickening pace of 
development on federal and tribal lands, and developed a cost-benefit 
analysis projected over a ten-year period (2013 to 2022).118 According to 
that analysis, the benefits to be realized from the rule’s requirements 
regarding increased oversight of wellbore integrity and requirements for 
storage of wastewater ranged from twelve million to fifty million dollars 
per year while cost estimates ranged from thirty-seven million to forty-
four million dollars per year.119 The BLM also estimated a proposed cost 
burden “per well stimulation event” of about twelve thousand dollars, 
meaning that the rule would add that cost to each frack job.120  With 
regard to tribal lands, the support for the initial rule simply noted that the 
BLM proposed to apply the same “rules and standards to Indian lands so 
                                                                                                             
No. 112-106, 12 (Apr. 19, 2012) (statement of Tim Spisak, Deputy Assistant Dir., 
Minerals and Realty Mgmt., BLM). 
114. See, e.g., id. at 41, 43-44 (testimony and statement of James M. 
“Mike” Olguin, Vice-Chairman, S. Ute Indian Tribal Council, S. Ute Indian Tribe). 
115. U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, SECRETARIAL ORDER NO. 3317, 
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR POLICY ON CONSULTATION WITH INDIAN TRIBES 
(Dec. 1, 2011), available at https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/migrated/ 
tribes/upload/SO-3317-Tribal-Consultation-Policy.pdf. 
116. 77 Fed. Reg. 27,691. 
117. Id. 
118. Id. at 27,694 (“[a]s stewards of the public lands, and as the 
Secretary’s regulator for oil and gas leases on Indian lands, the BLM has evaluated 
the increased use of well stimulation practices over the last decade and determined 
that the existing rules for well stimulation require updating.” Id. at 27,699-700).  
119. Id. at 27,692, 27,702 (the analysis did not consider potential benefits 
from public disclosure of fracking chemicals) 
120. Id. at 27,702. 
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that these lands and communities receive the same level of protection 
provided for public lands.”121 Aside from that mention of the BLM’s 
interest in consistency across both tribal and public lands, the 
information published within the initial rule paid little attention to tribal 
interests.122 
 
B.  Tribal Response to the Initial Proposed Rule 
 
Upset by the perceived lack of consultation leading up to the 
publication of the initial rule, many tribes continued to raise complaints 
with both the rulemaking process and the substance of the initial rule 
after its publication in May 2012. For example, in commenting on the 
initial proposed rule, the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray 
Reservation (“Ute Indian Tribe”) of Utah expressed concern that the 
“BLM continue[d] to make the mistakes of the past by proposing to 
impose a national rule based on public interest standards that will 
override tribal authority.”123 According to the Ute Indian Tribe, the 
additional requirements suggested by the initial proposed rule could 
further delay development on its reservation, where “[i]t already takes 
about 5 to 20 [sic] times as long to get an oil and gas permit” as 
compared to non-tribal lands.124 The Council of Energy Resource Tribes 
(“CERT”), a coalition of tribes engaged in energy production, also 
commented on the potentially negative impacts of the initial proposed 
rule on tribal energy development.125 These concerns were echoed by 
other tribes reliant upon energy development for economic purposes, 
who also urged the BLM to engage in greater tribal consultation to better 
address these issues.126 
                                                 
121. Id. at 27,692. 
122. Id. at 27,704-05. 
123. UTE INDIAN TRIBE, COMMENTS ON PROPOSED RULE FOR OIL AND 
GAS; WELL STIMULATION, INCLUDING HYDRAULIC FRACTURING, ON FEDERAL AND 
INDIAN LAND 2 (Sept. 10, 2012), available at http://www.regulations.gov/#! 
documentDetail;D=BLM-2012-0001-7637 [hereinafter UTE COMMENTS]. 
124. Id. at 8. 
125. COUNCIL OF ENERGY RES. TRIBES, CERT LETTER RE COMMENTS TO 
HF RULE 09.10.12, 6-7 (Sept. 10, 2012), available at 
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=BLM-2012-0001-7204 (positing a 
guaranteed decline in revenue for tribes and Indian people as a result of the initial 
prosed rule) [hereinafter CERT COMMENTS].  
126. UTE TRIBE COMMENTS, supra note 123, at 2; MANDAN, HIDATSA, 
AND ARIKARA NATION, THREE AFFILIATED TRIBES, FORT BERTHOLD INDIAN 
RESERVATION, COMMENTS ON PROPOSED RULE FOR OIL AND GAS; WELL 
STIMULATION, INCLUDING HYDRAULIC FRACTURING, ON FEDERAL AND INDIAN 
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Beyond concerns over the potential delays caused by the initial 
proposed rule, a number of tribes engaged in energy development also 
questioned the legal basis of the BLM’s authority to apply the rule to 
Indian lands.127 In opening the discussion section of the publication of 
the initial proposed rule, the BLM cited the Federal Land Policy and 
Management Act (“FLPMA”) as the basis of the Agency’s authority to 
manage public lands and as establishing the standard—preventing undue 
and unnecessary degradation of those lands, the so-called “UUD 
standard”—for doing so.128 In its comments, the CERT noted that the 
definition of “public lands” to which FLPMA applies specifically 
excludes “lands held for the benefit of Indians.”129 Therefore, according 
to the CERT, whose argument was representative of the position taken 
by other tribes, even though the BLM also cited to both the IMLA and 
the IMDA, each of which authorize the Secretary to promulgate 
regulations to implement their statutory provisions on Indian lands,130 the 
Secretary could not delegate this authority to the BLM “because under 
FLPMA, Indian lands are specifically excluded” from the BLM’s 
jurisdiction.131  
Similarly, the Mandan, Hidatsa, and Arikara Nation, the Three 
Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation (“MHA Nation”) of 
North Dakota argued that the BLM did not assume any authority over 
leasing on Indian lands until the IMLA regulations were finalized in 
1996, which, because it came two decades after FLPMA, was also 
prohibited.132 The MHA Nation went on to argue that any attempt by the 
BLM to apply the standards applicable to public lands under FLPMA, 
which derive from the general UUD standard, would be inconsistent with 
the federal government’s fiduciary responsibilities to tribes.133 Consistent 
with tribal concerns over the potential economic impacts, those alleging 
                                                                                                             
LANDS 8 (Sept. 10, 2012), available at 
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=BLM-2012-0001-7405 
[hereinafter MHA COMMENTS]; Impacts of the Bureau of Land Management’s 
Hydraulic Fracturing Rule, supra note 113, at 61 (statement of Scott Russell, Sec’y 
of the Crow Tribe, Area Vice-President Rocky Mountain Region, Nat’l Cong. of 
Am. Indians). 
127. See, e.g., CERT COMMENTS, supra note 125, at 4-5. 
128. 77 Fed. Reg. at 27,694; see also, 43 U.S.C. § 1732b. 
129. CERT COMMENTS, supra note 125, at 4. 
130. 25 U.S.C. §§ 396d, 2107.  
131. CERT COMMENTS, supra note 125, at 4-5.  
132. MHA COMMENTS, supra note 126, at 3. 
133. Id. at 4-5 (citing United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 225-26 
(1983)). 
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a lack of statutory basis for the initial proposed rule urged a return to 
tribal consultation to address the unique statutory scheme applicable to 
Indian lands and allow greater consideration of the federal trust 
relationship toward Indian tribes.134 
In addition to tribes concerned about the potential for the initial 
proposed rule to further delay development, some tribes also expressed 
concern that the BLM’s rules would interfere with their ability to 
sufficiently protect their citizens from the risks of fracking. At a 
Congressional oversight hearing just before publication of the initial 
proposed rule, for example, the Co-Chairman of the Business Council of 
the Eastern Shoshone Tribe of Wyoming made clear that, although his 
tribe supported energy development, the “main goal should not be how 
quickly we can get permits approved but how do we support safe and 
responsible development.”135 As such, the primary worry of the tribes on 
his reservation was “that the BLM ha[d] shown that they cannot bring 
about compliance with existing policies and statutes.”136 Similarly, a 
Tribal Council Representative from the Turtle Mountain Band of 
Chippewa Indians of North Dakota pointed out that, at the time of the 
hearing, his was “the only tribe in this nation [sic] who will not allow 
fracking on [their] land” due to water quality concerns.137 Nonetheless, 
although based on divergent interests, these tribal leaders, like those of 
the tribes critical of the rule for its potentially negative impacts on 
development, urged a greater role for tribal regulation in place of federal 
oversight.138 
After extending the initial comment deadline from one month to 
three and receiving comments until September 2010, the BLM went back 
to the drawing board on the initial proposed rule.139 Prior to doing so, the 
                                                 
134. See Id. at 5; CERT COMMENTS, supra note 125, at 21; UTE 
COMMENTS, supra note 123, at 6-7. 
135. Impacts of the Bureau of Land Management’s Hydraulic Fracturing 
Rule, supra note 113, at 53 (statement of Wes Martel, Co-Chairman, E. Shoshone 
Tribe).  
136. Id. 
137. Id. at 55. 
138. Id. at 54 (“[w]e believe a more enhanced regulatory role for the 
Tribes is part of the answer.”); id. at 57 (“Turtle Mountain people know our land 
best, we know our resources, we know what methods of mining and drilling we are 
comfortable with, and we are best suited to make the decisions that impact our land 
and our people.”) (statement of Larry DeCoteau, Tribal Council Rep., Dist. 4, Turtle 
Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians). 
139. Oil and Gas; Well Stimulation, Including Hydraulic Fracturing, on 
Federal and Indian Lands, Proposed Rule, Extension of Comment Period, 77 Fed. 
Reg. 38024 (June 26, 2012). 
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Agency engaged in additional tribal consultation sessions in the summer 
of 2012, during which tribes continued to express concerns over both the 
BLM’s consultation during the rulemaking process and the substance of 
the initial proposed rule.140 The results of the additional consultation 
sessions and agency analysis became clear with the publication of a 
supplemental rule nearly a year later. 
 
C.  Supplemental Rule 
 
The BLM published its revised fracking rule in the Federal 
Register on May 24, 2013, and, in the information published with the 
revised rule, sought to address many of the comments raised by tribes 
and tribal interests in response to the initial proposed rule.141 For 
example, in response to the concerns of energy tribes that the rule would 
result in additional delays, the Agency pointed to revisions in the 
substance of the rule aimed at reducing administrative burdens.142 In 
addition, the BLM attempted to better explain its view of the rule’s 
statutory support and relationship between the rule and Indian Country to 
respond to tribal concerns over the Agency’s respect for tribal 
sovereignty and the distinction between federal and Indian lands.143 
Like the initial proposed rule, the revised rule primarily focused 
on standards related to ensuring wellbore integrity, disclosure of fracking 
chemicals, and treatment of wastewater produced through the fracking 
process.144 Unlike the stricter technical standards of the initial proposed 
rule, however, the revised rule allowed for some additional flexibility in 
meeting those standards.145 For example, the revised rule removed the 
initial proposed rule’s requirement that an operator submit the results of 
wellbore integrity testing before fracking and, instead, so long as there 
                                                 
140. See, e.g., Glenda Embry, Pub. Info. Officer, Consultation Meeting 
with BIA and BLM Held at Four Bears on Proposed New Rule on Hydraulic 
Fracturing, MHA NATION (July 17, 2012), 
http://www.mhanation.com/main2/Home_News/Home_News_2012/News_2012_07
_July/news_2012_july17.html. 
141. Oil and Gas; Hydraulic Fracturing on Federal and Indian Lands, 78 
Fed. Reg. 31,636 (May 24, 2013). 
142. Id. 
143. Id. at 31,639-40. 
144. Id. at 31,636. 
145. See, e.g., id. at 31,641 (describing a change in the revised rule that 
would remove the requirement of a cement bond log prior to a fracking operation 
and replace it with a requirement that cement evaluation log be submitted after the 
operation, “unless there [we]re problems with the cement job.”) 
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were no indications of other integrity issues, proposed allowing the 
submission of a wider variety of cement evaluation information within 
thirty days after fracking operations.146 In addition, the revised rule 
touted additional reliance on existing state standards, such as Colorado’s 
protection of trade secrets in the context of chemical disclosures.147 
Rather than impose it as an additional requirement, the revised rule also 
sought additional input as to the costs and benefits of requiring that fluids 
flowing back from fracking operations be stored only in closed tanks.148  
Notwithstanding the BLM’s attention to the procedural and 
administrative burdens of the revised rule, however, the Agency noted 
that the rule would still result in costs of twelve to twenty million dollars 
annually, a substantial portion of which would result from the cement 
testing requirements.149 In specifically responding to tribal concerns over 
the additional costs imposed by federal regulations applicable to tribal 
lands, especially when compared to private lands, the BLM noted in 
publishing the revised rule that it was “aware that [despite some reduced 
requirements,] the revised proposed rule would nonetheless result in 
some higher costs for operators on . . . Indian lands, compared with 
compliance costs for hydraulic fracturing on . . . non-Indian lands,” but 
that those costs were “only one set in a long list of costs that operators 
compare to anticipated revenues when deciding whether and how much 
to bid on a[n] Indian lease.”150 
In addition to showing greater sensitivity to tribal concerns over 
administrative burdens than it had in the initial proposed rule, the BLM 
used the publication of the revised proposed rule to respond to tribal 
concerns over the Agency’s statutory authority to promulgate a rule 
applicable to Indian lands and the Agency’s responsibility to tribes. With 
regard to the tribal arguments that Congress, by enacting FLPMA and 
excluding Indian lands from the definition of public lands, stripped the 
BLM of any authority over Indian lands, the BLM responded that 
FLPMA also charges the BLM with the responsibility to carry out other 
duties assigned to it by the Secretary or assigned to the Secretary by law 
                                                 
146. Id. at 31,641 (comparing the initial proposed rules, 43 C.F.R. § 
3162.3-3(c)(2) (2015) (requiring a Cement Bond Log before fracking), with their 
amended version. 43 C.F.R. § 3162.3-3(e)(2), published at, 78 Fed. Reg. at 31,675 
(requiring submission within 30 days of completion of fracking operations of a 
Cement Evaluation Log, which may be a Cement Bond Log or other “class of tools 
that verify the integrity of annular cement bonding”)). 
147. 78 Fed. Reg. at 31,637. 
148. Id. 
149. Id. at 31,665. 
150. Id. at 31,670. 
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subsequent to FLPMA.151 Thus, according to the BLM, the Secretary’s 
authority to regulate leasing on Indian lands under the IMLA and the 
IMDA is reaffirmed by FLPMA, and “the Secretary, through the [IMLA 
and IMDA] regulations promulgated by the Bureau of Indian Affairs 
(“BIA”), has assigned to the BLM part of the Secretary’s trust 
responsibilities to regulate oil and gas operations on those Indian 
lands.”152 To the extent such regulations are viewed by tribes as in 
conflict with tribal sovereignty, the Agency noted that other regulations 
already apply to oil and gas development on Indian lands, citing the 
IMLA and IMDA regulations.153  
Lastly, although the BLM “embrace[d]” the federal policies 
supportive of tribal self-determination, the Agency noted in publishing 
the revised rule that it had “consistently interpreted” the Secretary’s 
authority to promulgate rules and regulations under the IMLA to “allow[] 
uniform regulations governing mineral resource development on Indian 
and Federal lands” and thereby prohibit treating tribes differently by 
allowing a tribal opt-out or delegation provision.154 However, the revised 
rule suggested that tribes could assert greater control through the 
authority of other federal statutes, such as contracting to assume some of 
the BLM’s programs pursuant to the Indian Self-Determination and 
Education Assistance Act (“ISDEAA”).155 In addition, the revised rule 
allowed the BLM to consider a variance “that would allow compliance 
with . . . tribal requirements to be accepted as compliance with the rule, if 
the variance meets or exceeds th[e] rule’s standards.”156 In support of the 
BLM’s unwillingness to recognize tribal authority and exempt tribal 
lands from the rule, the BLM maintained that such an exemption “would 
require the Secretary . . . to conclude . . . that usable waters in Indian 
lands, and the persons who use such waters, are less deserving of 
protection than waters and water users on Federal lands.”157 In other 
                                                 
151. Id. at 31,669 (citing 43 U.S.C. § 1731(a), (b) (2012)). 
152. Id. 
153. Id. (The BLM did not mention the role that tribal input played in the 
development of those earlier IMLA and IMDA regulations). 
154. Id. at 31,640. 
155. Id. Although the ISDEAA allows for the assumption of federal 
administrative functions, it does not provide a delegation of federal authority or 
recognition of broader tribal regulatory authority. Instead, in the performance of 
ISDEAA contracts, “[u]ltimate control remains within the federal government.” 
Kevin K. Washburn, Tribal Self-Determination at the Crossroads, 38 CONN. L. REV. 
777, 786 (2006).  
156. Id.  
157. 78 Fed. Reg. at 31,669. 
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words, the BLM could not fulfill its perceived duty to protect Indian 
resources by allowing tribes to assume responsibility for such protection. 
In crafting the revised rule, the BLM thus refused to consider 
whether the revised rule should treat Indian lands differently than federal 
lands. Instead, the BLM doubled down on the need for uniform 
protection across both federal and Indian lands and its perceived need for 
ongoing consistency of statutory interpretation supportive of such 
uniformity. Under the revised rule, therefore, tribes remained subject to 
the BLM’s regulatory authority but could seek a variance from certain 
provisions, provided tribal regulations were more stringent than the 
BLM’s revised rules, or utilize other means to assume responsibility for 
carrying out the BLM’s functions. But the proposed rule neither 
recognized nor allowed tribes to assume any additional regulatory 
authority over fracking. As the BLM might have anticipated, the revised 
rule did not satisfy many tribes. 
 
D.  Tribal Response to the Supplemental Rule 
 
Predictably, and notwithstanding the BLM’s efforts to streamline 
the administrative burdens from the initial proposed rule, tribes remained 
concerned about the revised rule. Energy development-focused tribes 
like the MHA Nation and the Ute Indian Tribe reiterated their arguments 
about the lack of statutory basis for the BLM’s rule and maintained their 
positions that the rule would greatly affect, if not eliminate, development 
on their reservations.158 In addition, the National Congress of American 
Indians (“NCAI”), a national association of Indian tribes established in 
1944, weighed in on behalf of its member tribes and urged the BLM to 
engage in meaningful consultation.159 The NCAI noted the passage of 
                                                 
158. MANDAN, HIDATSA, AND ARIKARA NATION, THREE AFFILIATED 
TRIBES, FORT BERTHOLD INDIAN RESERVATION, COMMENTS ON REVISED PROPOSED 
RULE FOR OIL AND GAS; HYDRAULIC FRACTURING ON FEDERAL AND INDIAN LANDS 
(Aug. 23, 2013), available at 
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=BLM-2013-0002-5681; UTE 
INDIAN TRIBE, COMMENTS ON SUPPLEMENTAL NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULE FOR OIL 
AND GAS; HYDRAULIC FRACTURING ON FEDERAL AND INDIAN LANDS (Aug. 23, 
2013), available at http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=BLM-2013-
0002-5658. 
159. Letter from Jackie Pata, Exec. Dir., Nat’l Cong. of Am. Indians to 
Neil Kornze, Principal Deputy Dir., Bureau of Land Mgmt. (Aug. 23, 2013), 
available at http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=BLM-2013-0002-
4214 [hereinafter NCAI Comments]. 
 
 
 
2016             TRIBES AND THE BLM’S FRACKING RULE                 31 
 
 
two separate resolutions at two of its national tribal conferences, each of 
which demanded that the BLM engage in further dialogue with tribes.160 
While the NCAI’s comments also mentioned the impacts of the 
revised rule on energy development in Indian Country, other tribes 
expressed greater concern over the impacts of the revised rule on their 
authority to regulate and restrict fracking on their lands. The Standing 
Rock Sioux Tribe (“Standing Rock”) of North Dakota, for example, 
blasted the revised rule for its failure to comply with the federal 
government’s trust obligation to tribes because the rule did not 
adequately protect Standing Rock’s water resources, public health, or 
environment.161 In addition, Standing Rock expressed grave concern that 
the BLM lacked adequate authority to effectively enforce the less-than-
adequate protections provided by the revised rule.162 In doing so, 
Standing Rock noted that “[t]ribal sovereignty is jeopardized when 
federal agencies impose rules governing Indian Country.”163 Instead, the 
“BLM should defer to Tribal law [sic] for compliance purposes, 
consistent with the federal trust responsibility.”164  
Like Standing Rock, the Assiniboine and Sioux Tribes of the 
Fort Peck Reservation (“Fort Peck Tribes”) of Montana, whose lands lie 
on the western edge of the Bakken field and, at the time, faced 
significant potential development,165 supported the need for additional 
                                                 
160. Id. 
161. STANDING ROCK SIOUX TRIBE, STANDING ROCK SIOUX TRIBE - 
COMMENTS ON PROPOSED RULE FOR HYDRAULIC FRACTURING ON FEDERAL AND 
INDIAN LAND 1 (Aug. 23, 2013), available at http://www.regulations.gov/#! 
documentDetail;D=BLM-2013-0002-5573. 
162. Id. at 4-5. 
163. Id. at 4.  
164. Id. at 5; see also Letter from Sally J. Kniffin, Envtl. Specialist, 
Saginaw-Chippewa Indian Tribe to Dir., Bureau of Land Mgmt. (Aug. 23, 2013), 
available at http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=BLM-2013-0002-
0139; E. SHOSHONE TRIBE, EASTERN SHOSHONE TRIBE’S COMMENTS ON PROPOSED 
RULE: OIL AND GAS; HYDRAULIC FRACTURING ON FEDERAL AND INDIAN LANDS 
(Aug. 23, 2013), available at 
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=BLM-2013-0002-5575. 
165. Since 2013, the falling price of oil has virtually eliminated the 
prospect of economic gains from oil and gas development on the reservation of the 
Fort Peck Tribes. See Matthew Frank, Over a Barrel: The Boom and Bust, the 
Promise and Peril, of the Bakken, MISSOULA INDEPENDENT (Mar. 24, 2016) 
available at http://missoulanews.bigskypress.com/missoula/over-a-
barrel/Content?oid=2744707. 
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protection from the risks posed by fracking.166 In commenting on the 
revised rule, the Fort Peck Tribes provided detailed critiques of many of 
the substantive provisions and offered their own perspective based on 
their experience with regulating fracking on their lands.167 The Fort Peck 
Tribes’ comments also highlighted the inadequacy of the new variance 
process proposed by the revised rule.168 In May 2012, the Fort Peck 
Tribes adopted their own requirements for oil and gas leases on the 
reservation, which would mandate the use of best management practices 
for noise and light pollution, protection of ground and surface water, and 
other development operations.169 The Fort Peck Tribes noted that the 
revised rule appeared to allow for the adoption of these tribal rules as 
“variances” by the BLM; however, it was “immediately apparent that a 
procedure of some sort [was] necessary.”170 With oil development 
“loom[ing] across [the Fort Peck] Reservation’s border,” the revised rule 
left the Fort Peck Tribes looking for a “place to initiate [a] dialogue” 
with BLM on the adoption of a variance that could incorporate their own 
tribal standards for ensuring protection of their lands.171 
Therefore, although the BLM revised its initial proposed rule to 
reduce administrative burdens, the revised rule still fell short of tribal 
expectations both for tribes seeking to expedite energy development and 
those desiring greater regulatory authority to restrict such development 
and ensure protection of their lands from the risks of fracking. In 
addition, although the BLM touted the inclusion of a rule allowing the 
Agency to approve a variance for tribes, there was no process for 
discussing or incorporating such variances into the BLM rule, nor did the 
revised rule suggest that a variance would support tribal authority. Thus, 
although tribes had, in the time between the initial proposed and the 
revised rule, sought additional consultation with the BLM and 
consistently urged the Agency to demonstrate greater deference to tribal 
sovereign authority, the revised rule did little to accommodate tribal 
                                                 
166. FORT PECK TRIBE OFFICE OF ENVTL. PROT., COMMENTS ON THE 
PLB’S PROPOSED RULE: “OIL AND GAS; HYDRAULIC FRACTURING ON FEDERAL AND 
INDIAN LANDS” (Aug. 28, 2013), available at http://www.regulations.gov/#! 
documentDetail;D=BLM-2013-0002-5719. 
167. Id. at 5 (discussing use of open pits). 
168. Id. at 15. 
169. Id. at 16-18 (Resolution #26-790-2012-05 and the accompanying 
best management practices are attached to the Fort Peck Tribes’ comment letter to 
BLM).  
170. Id. at 15. 
171. Id. 
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concerns.172 After another extended comment period on the revised rule 
closed on August 23, 2013, tribes awaited the next efforts of the BLM.173 
 
E.  The Final Rule 
 
The BLM published its final rule on March 26, 2015, nearly two 
years after it had published the revised rule and almost five years since 
Secretary Salazar held the initial public forum on fracking.174 The 
information published with the Final Rule largely tracked that of the 
revised rule and the substance of the Final Rule itself included only slight 
variations on the requirements proposed by the revised rule.175 The Final 
Rule’s significant substantive changes allowed some additional 
                                                 
172. These concerns were neatly summed up by the NCAI’s comments 
on the revised rule, which demanded that any rule issued by BLM: 
 Respect that the United States has a unique legal and 
political relationship with Indian tribes and a special relationship 
with Alaska Native entities as provided in the Constitution of the 
United States, treaties, and federal statutes. These relationships 
extend to the federal government’s historic preservation activities, 
mandating that federal consultation with tribes be meaningful, in 
good faith, and entered into on a government-to-government 
basis; 
 Acknowledge the sovereign authority of Indian tribes to 
make decisions about activities occurring on their own lands by 
ordinance, resolution, or other action authorized under such 
constitution or bylaw; 
 Provide assistance, either directly or through contract, to 
interested Indian tribes in the development of tribal regulatory 
capacity and the development of tribal hydraulic fracturing 
regulations; and that the proposed regulation’s provision on 
variances should be amended to provide that tribal regulation and 
procedures may replace the federal regulations, provided that the 
tribal regulations are consistent with the objectives of the federal 
regulations;  
 Affirm that Indian lands are not public lands as defined in 
the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976; and 
 Allow tribes to opt out of federal regulation and use their 
own regulations so that tribal regulatory authority is maximized 
and regulatory duplication is avoided. 
NCAI Comments, supra note 159, at 2. 
173. Oil and Gas; Hydraulic Fracturing on Federal and Indian Lands, 
Supplemental Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Extension of Comment Period, 78 
Fed. Reg. 34,611 (June 10, 2013). 
174. 80 Fed. Reg. 16,128.  
175. Compare, e.g., 78 Fed. Reg. 31,637, with 80 Fed. Reg. at 16,128. 
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flexibility for testing wellbore integrity, revised the disclosure 
requirements for fracking chemicals, and, subject to very limited 
exceptions, required the storage of fracking wastewater in tanks instead 
of lined pits.176 The Final Rule also offered some additional clarity on the 
revised rule’s variance provisions and added language specifically 
prohibiting appeal of the BLM’s decision on a proposed variance, which 
decision remained solely within the Agency’s discretion.177  
As had the minimal substantive changes made to the revised rule 
by the Final Rule, the BLM’s justification for the Final Rule and 
treatment of the issues raised by tribes throughout the rulemaking 
process largely tracked the Agency’s earlier statements.178 Like the 
revised rule, the Final Rule largely relied upon the BLM’s stated need to 
update its own regulations in light of the expanding use of fracking and 
set forth the cost-benefit analysis of the Rule. A separate Regulatory 
Impact Analysis published contemporaneously with the Final Rule cited 
to “Public Concern” expressed at its 2010 public forum and follow-up 
public meetings in 2011.179 The Regulatory Impact Analysis also detailed 
the estimated cost impacts of the Final Rule and concluded that, across 
all tribal lands, the additional annual incremental cost of the Rule would 
be approximately ten million dollars, with the greatest impacts on the Ute 
Indian Reservation (1.2 million dollars) and the Fort Berthold 
Reservation of the MHA Nation (6.6 million dollars).180 Nowhere did the 
BLM’s Regulatory Impact Analysis consider or even mention tribal 
concerns regarding the effect that the Final Rule may have on tribal 
sovereignty. 
Similarly, the Final Rule summarily dismissed tribal input 
regarding the need to treat Indian lands separately and differently from 
federal lands. Repeating its refrain from the revised rule, the BLM stated 
in the Final Rule that it viewed treating federal and Indian lands 
differently as inconsistent with its “responsibilities under [the] IMLA,” 
specifically the provision authorizing the Secretary to promulgate 
                                                 
176. 80 Fed. Reg. at 16,129-30. 
177. Id. at 16140, 16,221. 
178. Compare, e.g., sections describing the Agency’s compliance, with 
Exec. Order No. 13,175, 65 Fed. Reg. 67,249 (Nov. 6, 2000), and Consultation and 
Coordination with Indian Tribal Governments from the Revised Rule, 78 Fed. Reg. 
31,669, 31,669-70, and Final Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 16,211-12. 
179. U.S. BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR 
HYDRAULIC FRACTURING RULE 8 (Mar. 26, 2015), available at http://www. 
regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=BLM-2015-0001-0002. 
180. Id. at 83-84, 87. 
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regulations applicable to mineral development on Indian lands.181 The 
BLM also reiterated that its authority for regulating Indian lands 
stemmed from laws other than FLPMA.182 In an enlightening departure 
from the justification for the revised rule, however, the BLM included 
with the publication of the Final Rule a new section addressing “Tribal 
Issues” in which the Agency admitted that, while adoption and 
implementation of the Final Rule would not be “the only possible way to 
carry out the Secretary’s trust responsibilities under the Indian mineral 
statutes,” the BLM viewed establishing a parallel regulatory scheme 
within the BIA as the only other option.183 The BLM also made clear its 
view of the federal trust responsibility toward tribes, stating that “[t]he 
BLM believes it is fulfilling its part of the Secretary’s trust 
responsibilities by requiring operations on Indian lands to meet the same 
standards as those on federal lands.”184 This conception of the trust 
responsibility further prevented the BLM from considering any means to 
allow greater exercise of tribal authority under the Final Rule because 
“the BLM has no way of terminating the Secretary’s trust responsibilities 
for hydraulic fracturing operations if a tribe were to opt-out [of the Final 
Rule] or if the BLM [deferred to] a tribe . . . implementing its own 
program.”185 Thus, in the BLM’s view, the Agency’s application of a 
uniform standard to both federal and Indian lands constituted the 
fulfillment of its trust responsibility and anything less than ensuring such 
uniform protection, even in recognition of tribal authority, would be an 
abdication of that responsibility. 
The “Tribal Issues” section continued with the BLM’s response 
to tribal criticism of the proposed variance provisions, noting that some 
tribes had suggested that those provisions did not comply with “policies 
promoting tribal sovereignty, self-determination, and the . . . trust 
responsibility.”186 The BLM again stated that it viewed the Final Rule as 
fulfilling the federal government’s trust responsibility by ensuring 
identical protections for Indian and federal lands.187 In addition, because 
the variance provisions allowed the Agency to consider applying tribal 
regulations if stricter than the Final Rule’s requirements, those provisions 
                                                 
181. 80 Fed. Reg. at 16,132 (citing 25 U.S.C. §396(d)). 
182. Id. at 16,137, 16,184. 
183. Id. at 16,185. 
184. Id. 
185. Id. 
186. Id. 
187. Id. 
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“accord[ ] with tribal self-determination to the extent that could be 
expected from a rule governing hydraulic fracturing operations.”188 
The Final Rule confirmed the BLM’s commitment to updating 
its fracking regulations and doing so in a manner that prioritized 
uniformity across federal and Indian lands without any significant 
distinction. As with the initial proposed and then revised rule, the BLM 
highlighted public input received in 2010 and 2011 as justification for 
the Final Rule and largely dismissed or minimized tribal input received 
through the Agency’s reactive consultations, begun in January 2012. 
Critically, the Final Rule also cemented the BLM’s view of its trust 
responsibility to Indian tribes as ensuring protection of their resources to 
the same extent the resources of public lands are protected and, because 
of that responsibility, there could be no room for the Final Rule to defer 
to tribal authority over Indian lands.  
Importantly, as this detailed review of the process leading to the 
Final Rule demonstrates, tribes were largely uniform in their criticism of 
the BLM’s inflexible approach to regulating on Indian lands even though 
their individual tribal interests varied. Comments from the tribes facing 
the greatest potential economic impacts, like the Ute Indian Tribe and the 
MHA Nation, and those primarily concerned with potential 
environmental impacts, like Standing Rock, both emphasized the need 
for increased tribal authority to ensure appropriate regulation of fracking 
on Indian lands. Short of broad recognition of tribal authority, tribes also 
expected to be afforded a greater role in consulting and coordinating with 
the BLM in the development of appropriate standards for their lands. 
Unlike the broader policy debate over the risks and benefits of fracking, 
the BLM’s Final Rule and the process through which the Agency 
developed that rule raised significant issues for tribes, regardless of each 
tribe’s position on fracking. These issues centered on the BLM’s 
misconception of the unique federal-tribal relationship and the Agency’s 
respect for tribal sovereignty and self-determination. As described in the 
next section, the BLM’s approach was more consistent with a bygone era 
of federal-tribal relations and failed to align with the federal 
government’s growing recognition that its trust responsibility requires 
support for and promotion of tribal sovereignty. This incongruence is 
particularly acute when analyzing the Final Rule according to the BLM’s 
standards for tribal consultation, the Final Rule’s statutory authority, and 
how other agencies view the federal trust responsibility with respect to 
the promulgation of their rules and regulations. 
 
                                                 
188. Id. 
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V.  AN UNFORTUNATE THROWBACK 
 
By failing to adequately account for tribal concerns in 
developing the Final Rule, the BLM’s efforts mark an unfortunate return 
to the bad old days of federal dominance and paternalism in Indian 
affairs. The roots of such paternalism were sewn in Chief Justice 
Marshall’s characterization of tribes as “domestic dependent nations” 
and, although federal policy swung wildly back and forth between the 
extremes of removal, assimilation and allotment, reorganization and 
termination of tribes over nearly the next 150 years, the underlying tenet 
of each of those policies was that tribes were generally incapable of 
handling their own affairs.189 Even in the 1930s era of the Indian 
Reorganization Act, when the federal government sought to enhance 
tribal sovereign authority through the restoration of tribal lands and 
support of tribal governments, the terms of many tribal constitutions 
required federal review and approval and the BIA maintained a 
significant and dominant presence on many reservations.190  
Following the failure of the federal termination policies of the 
1950s, the historical notions of federal dominance and paternalism were 
largely repudiated with the dawn of the self-determination era in the mid-
1970s. As President Richard M. Nixon made clear in his landmark 1970 
address to Congress on Indian affairs, neither termination nor over-
bearing federal paternalism is the right approach to Indian affairs:  
 
Federal termination errs in one direction, Federal 
paternalism errs in the other. Only by clearly rejecting 
both of these extremes can we achieve a policy which 
truly serves the best interests of the Indian people. Self-
                                                 
189. The schizophrenic history of federal Indian policy has been well 
documented. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at §§ 1.03-1.06, 23-93. With 
regard to paternalism in particular, see Tadd M. Johnson & James Hamilton, Self-
Governance of Indian Tribes: From Paternalism to Empowerment, 27 CONN. L. 
REV. 1251, 1252-622 (1995). 
190. CHARLES WILKINSON, BLOOD STRUGGLE 62, 190-91 (2006). The 
historic relationship between the BIA and tribes explains the BIA’s alternate but oft-
heard name around Indian Country: “Bossing Indians Around.” See, e.g., Deborah 
Ziff, A ‘Historic Day’ at Pueblo, ALBUQUERQUE JOURNAL (Mar. 15, 2013), 
available at http://www.abqjournal.com/178475/news/a-historic-day-at-pueblo.html 
(quoting then-Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs Kevin Washburn as recognizing 
that “not that long ago . . . tribal leaders complained that BIA stood for ‘Bossing 
Indians Around’”); Robert McCarthy, The Bureau of Indian Affairs and the Federal 
Trust Obligation to American Indians, 19 BYU J. PUB. L. 1, 4-15 (2004). 
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determination among the Indian people can and must be 
encouraged without the threat of eventual termination.191  
 
In calling for a new federal commitment to tribal self-determination, 
President Nixon noted that the policy was “what the Indians themselves 
have long been telling us” and that it was time to “create the conditions 
for a new era in which the Indian future is determined by Indian acts and 
Indian decisions.”192  
The federal commitment to self-determination called for by 
President Nixon in 1970 resulted in significant changes in the federal-
tribal relationship, although those changes came gradually. For example, 
the 1975 passage of the ISDEAA authorized tribes to contract with the 
federal government to assume responsibility over various federal 
programs provided for Indians.193 Tribes have used these agreements to 
take on administrative functions related to management of natural 
resources, such as forest and rangelands, which had previously been 
performed by the BIA.194 This assumption of greater responsibility, if not 
greater authority,195 enhanced tribal management capability and although 
the federal agencies tasked with carrying out this commitment have often 
frustrated the practice of engaging in self-determination, particularly on 
funding issues,196 the ISDEAA thereby began a gradual shift of the 
federal-tribal relationship away from its traditional federal paternalism. 
This shift in the federal-tribal relationship also played out in the 
context of energy development. The IMDA was passed in 1982—just 
seven years after ISDEAA—and was largely the result of tribal efforts to 
assume greater control over mineral leasing than allowed by the 
                                                 
191. Special Message to the Congress on Indian Affairs, 213 Pub. Papers 
564, 567-76 (July 8, 1970) (President Richard M. Nixon). 
192. Id. at 565; see also, WILKINSON, supra note 190, at 189-90 (quoting 
tribal leader questioning federal oversight in 1919). 
193. 25 U.S.C. §§ 450a, 450b(j) (2012) (these contracts are often referred 
to as “638 contracts” in light of the ISDEAA’s public law number, 93-638). 
194. See Geoffrey D. Strommer & Stephen D. Osborne, The History, 
Status, and Future of Tribal Self Governance Under the Indian Self-Determination 
and Education Assistance Act, 39 AM. IND. L. REV. 1 (2015).  
195. See, e.g., Washburn, supra note 155, at 786 (existing self-
determination efforts are important to shift “day-to-day control” over federal funds 
to tribes even if they do not “disrupt the allocation of power between the federal 
government and tribes.”) 
196. See, e.g., Cherokee Nation v. Leavitt, 543 U.S. 631, 638 (2005); 
Johnson & Hamilton, supra note 189, at 1263-78; Strommer & Osborne, supra note 
194, at 48-61. 
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Reorganization-era IMLA.197 As a result, although the IMDA still 
requires secretarial approval of mineral development agreements and 
consideration of whether those agreements are in the tribe’s best 
interests,198 tribes were able to engage in much broader and more 
independent negotiation of agreements related to the development of 
their mineral resources. Thus, tribes could move from passive lessors of 
their minerals to active participants in their development.199 
More recent efforts further emphasized tribal self-determination 
and sovereignty over energy development on tribal lands. The 2005 
Indian Tribal Energy Development and Self-Determination Act 
(“ITEDSDA”) authorized Tribal Energy Resource Agreements 
(“TERA”), which once negotiated and entered into between an Indian 
tribe and the Secretary, would authorize a tribe to enter into a variety of 
energy-related agreements, such as leases and rights-of-way, without 
subsequent secretarial approval of each individual agreement.200 
Although a complex capacity determination and application process, 
among other issues, have so far deterred any tribe from entering a TERA, 
the ITEDSDA’s expansion of tribal authority over energy development is 
representative of the continuing evolution of the self-determination 
era.201 The Helping Expedite and Advance Responsible Tribal 
Homeownership Act (“HEARTH Act”), 202 enacted in 2012, represents a 
similar landmark of federal commitment to tribal self-determination. 
Pursuant to the HEARTH Act, a tribe can approve leases of its surface 
lands, so long as the Secretary has approved the tribe’s rules for doing so 
and those rules are “consistent with” federal leasing regulations.203 
                                                 
197. See Carla Fredericks, Plenary Energy, 118 W. VA. L. REV. 789, 
798-802 (2015). 
198. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2102(a), 2103(b) (2012). 
199. See Royster, supra note 73, at 585-89. 
200. 25 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3506 (2012).  
201. GAO-15-502, supra note 98. Although supportive of tribal self-
determination, the ITEDSDA’s implementing regulations prevent tribes from 
assuming responsibility for “inherently Federal functions.” 25 C.F.R. § 224.52(c) 
(2008). The precise definition of this term remains unclear as does the scope of 
federal regulations that would remain applicable to a tribe that has entered a TERA. 
GAO-15-502, supra note 98, at 32-33. Thus, despite the Agency’s suggestion in the 
Final Rule that tribes could “assert more control over oil and gas operations on tribal 
land by entering” a TERA, tribes may be unable to assume any of BLM’s regulatory 
authority over fracking under a TERA, particularly in light of BLM’s view of its 
duty to provide federal oversight for fracking. 80 Fed. Reg. at 16,132. 
202. 25 U.S.C. § 415(h) (2012). 
203. Id. § 415(h)(3)(B)(i). The HEARTH Act is limited to the lease of 
tribal surface lands and does not currently address mineral leasing. Even if mineral 
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Unlike TERAs, over twenty tribes have taken advantage of the HEARTH 
Act and exercise largely independent authority to lease their surface 
lands.204 
Thus, the shift away from federal paternalism and toward federal 
support of tribal governance and sovereignty has now pervaded federal 
policy for a generation. As tribes have exercised expanding authority, 
their capacity for doing so successfully has correspondingly expanded as 
well. This expansion in the exercise of actual sovereignty, real nation 
building, has proven to have significantly positive economic and social 
effects.205 
Ultimately, when viewed in light of the continuing efforts of the 
federal government to promote tribal authority and self-determination, 
the BLM’s response to concerns over the Final Rule raised by tribes 
through the rulemaking process is, at best, a throwback to earlier policy 
eras of federal dominance. The inappropriateness of this approach is 
particularly clear when analyzed in the context of the Agency’s 
obligations to tribal consultation, adherence to statutory authority, and 
the trust responsibility. 
 
A.  Tribal Consultation 
 
The federal government’s commitment to consultation with 
tribal governments is not a new phenomenon, as evidenced by Congress’ 
1982 mandate to the Secretary in the IMDA.206 After reviewing a 
comprehensive history of the federal government’s approach to tribal 
consultation, from treaty-making to self-determination era statutory 
requirements and recent court decisions, Professor Robert Miller 
concluded that “the duty of federal consultation and consent with Indian 
nations is a very well established legal principle in the history, statutes, 
                                                                                                             
leasing were to be included in the HEARTH Act, tribal leasing regulations would 
likely need to include reference to the BLM’s regulations in order to maintain 
“consistency” with the current IMDA and IMLA leasing regulations. 
204. GAO-15-502, supra note 98, at 1 n.33; Bureau of Indian Aff. 
HEARTH Act of 2012, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, http://www.indianaffairs. 
gov/WhoWeAre/BIA/OTS/HEARTH/index.htm (last visited December 18, 2015). 
205. Stephen Cornell & Joseph P. Kalt, Two Approaches to the 
Development of Native Nations: One Works, the Other Doesn’t, in REBUILDING 
NATIVE NATIONS: STRATEGIES FOR GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT 6-7 (Miriam 
Jorgensen, ed. 2007) (comparing the “Nation Building Approach” with the 
“Standard Approach” that dominated two centuries of federal Indian policy and 
concluding that the former “works” while the latter “has proven a failure”). 
206. 25 U.S.C. § 2107; see infra Section III.B. 
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administrative regulations, and case law of the United States.”207 Other 
commentators have suggested that the duty of the federal government to 
consult with Indian tribes should be considered a necessary procedural 
component of the federal government’s trust responsibility.208 
In conjunction with the self-determination era, the Executive 
Branch has in recent years committed to ensuring consultation with 
Indian tribes regarding matters that may affect their interests. This 
commitment is expressed through a series of Executive Orders and 
Memoranda issued by President William J. Clinton,209 and reaffirmed by 
Presidents George W. Bush210 and Barack H. Obama.211 President 
Obama’s 2009 Presidential Memorandum demanded of his 
Administration “regular and meaningful consultation and collaboration 
with tribal officials in policy decision that have tribal implications.”212 In 
order to carry through on that mandate, the Memorandum reaffirmed 
President Clinton’s earlier Executive Order and required that each 
Executive agency develop “a detailed plan of actions” to implement that 
Executive Order within 90 days of November 9, 2009.213 Largely in 
response to that directive, the DOI published notice and sought 
comments on a proposed Department of the Interior Policy on 
Consultation with Indian Tribes.214 Secretary Salazar issued the DOI’s 
                                                 
207. Robert J. Miller, Consultation or Consent: The United States Duty 
to Confer with American Indian Governments, 91 N.D. L. REV. ___, at *17 (2015) 
(forthcoming publication), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2666687. 
208. Colette Routel & Jeffrey Holth, Toward Genuine Tribal 
Consultation in the 21st Century, 46 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 417, 435-36 (2013). 
209. Enhancing the Intergovernmental Partnership, Exec. Order No. 
12,875, 58 Fed. Reg. 58,903 (Oct. 26, 1993); Government to Government 
Relationships with Native American Tribal Governments, 59 Fed. Reg. 22,951 (May 
4, 1994); Indian Sacred Sites, Exec. Order No. 13,007, 61 Fed Reg. 26,771 (May 24, 
2006); Consultation and Cooperation with Indian Tribal Government, Exec. Order 
No. 13,084, 63 Fed. Reg. 27,655 (May 14, 1998); Consultation and Coordination 
with Indian Tribal Governments, Exec. Order No. 13,175, 65 Fed. Reg. 67,249 
(Nov. 6, 2000). 
210. Memorandum on Government-to-Government Relationship with 
Tribal Governments, 2 PUB. PAPERS 2177 (Sept. 23, 2004). 
211. Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and 
Agencies: Tribal Consultation, 74 Fed. Reg. 57,879 (Nov. 9, 2009); see also Miller, 
supra note 207, at *17-20. 
212. 74 Fed. Reg. at 57,881. 
213. Id.  
214. Policy on Consultation with Indian Tribes, 76 Fed. Reg. 28,446 
(May 17, 2011). 
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policy through Secretarial Order 3317 on December 1, 2011.215 The 
requirements of the departmental policy were incorporated into the 
Department’s Manual of Operations (“Departmental Manual”) on 
November 9, 2015.216 
Like the broader requirements of the Executive Order and 
Presidential Memorandum, the Departmental Manual requires that 
agencies within the DOI are “open and candid with tribal government(s) 
during consultations and incorporate tribal views in their decision 
making processes.”217 The Manual further requires that consultation 
begin “as early as possible when [an agency is] considering a 
Departmental action with tribal implications and provide Indian tribes a 
meaningful opportunity to participate in the consultation process.”218 
Furthermore, the Manual encourages the use of various methods of 
engagement, including negotiated rulemaking.219 Each of these 
requirements track the directives of Executive Order 13,175, issued in 
2000.220  
Importantly, Executive Order 13,175 and the subsequent Obama 
Presidential Memorandum disclaim the creation of any legally 
enforceable right or benefit by virtue of the establishment of the 
consultation requirements.221 In light of these disclaimers, tribes have 
often relied upon separate statutory authorities requiring consultation, 
such as the National Historic Preservation Act (“NHPA”), to support 
challenges to federal agency action based on a lack of adequate 
                                                 
215. U.S. SEC’Y OF THE INTERIOR, DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR POLICY 
ON CONSULTATION WITH INDIAN TRIBES, ORDER NO. 3317 (Dec. 1, 2011), available 
at https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/migrated/tribes/ 
upload/SO-3317-Tribal-Consultation-Policy.pdf. 
216. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR POLICY ON 
CONSULTATION WITH INDIAN TRIBES AND ALASKA NATIVE CORPORATIONS pt. 512, 
ch. 4 (Nov. 9, 2015), available at http://elips.doi.gov/ELIPS/DocView.aspx?id=4220 
[hereinafter POLICY ON CONSULTATION]; DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, PROCEDURES FOR 
CONSULTATION WITH INDIAN TRIBES pt. 512, ch. 5 (Nov. 9, 2015), available at 
http://elips.doi.gov/ELIPS/DocView.aspx?id=4218 [hereinafter PROCEDURES FOR 
CONSULTATION].   
217. PROCEDURES FOR CONSULTATION, supra note 216, at pt. 512, ch. 
5.4(A). 
218. Id. at pt. 512, ch. 5.5(A)(1). 
219. Id. at pt. 512, ch. 5.5(A)(2); see also 5 U.S.C. §§ 561-570a (2012). 
220. Compare, e.g., PROCEDURES FOR CONSULTATION, supra note 216, at 
pt. 512, ch. 5.5(A)(1), with Exec. Order No. 13,175, § 5(b)(2)(A), 65 Fed. Reg. at 
67,250. 
221. Exec. Order No. 13,175, § 10, 65 Fed. Reg. at 67252; Memorandum 
for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies: Tribal Consultation, 74 Fed. 
Reg. 57,881, 57,882 (Nov. 5, 2009). 
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consultation.222 That act and its implementing regulations focus on the 
necessity to ensure adequate tribal input before the approval of projects 
by a federal agency that may impact areas of historical or cultural 
significance.223 Tribes have successfully pursued injunction of certain 
federal actions where the federal agencies authorizing those actions 
failed to comply with the statutory or regulatory standards.224 Even in 
these instances, however, detailed judicial review of the quality of tribal 
consultation efforts by federal agencies can be rare.225 
Nonetheless, a United States Federal District Court Judge for the 
District of Wyoming, in preliminarily enjoining the Final Rule based on 
a challenge filed by numerous states and joined by the Ute Indian Tribe, 
found “merit” in the Ute Indian Tribe’s argument that the BLM’s tribal 
consultation on the Final Rule failed to comply with the terms of the 
Department of Interior Manual.226 In doing so, the court relied upon the 
timing of the BLM’s consultation and specifically noted that the BLM 
had already engaged in significant public discussion and drafted the rule 
before seeking to consult with tribes.227 This offered the tribes 
opportunity for input that amounted to “little more than that offered to 
the public in general” and was not the “extra, meaningful efforts” 
required by the Department Manual.228 In addition, the district court 
found it critical that tribal consultation resulted in only two minimal 
changes to the Final Rule from the revised version that had been 
previously proposed.229 Based on these findings, the court concluded the 
BLM’s failure to comply with the Departmental Manual amounted to an 
“arbitrary and capricious action” on which the Ute Indian Tribe would 
likely prevail.230  
                                                 
222. 54 U.S.C. § 302706(b) (2012); Miller, supra note 207, at *15-17 
nn.80-92 (collecting cases). 
223. 54 U.S.C. § 302706(b); 36 C.F.R. §§ 800.2-800.6. 
224. See, e.g., Pit River Tribe v. U.S. Forest Serv., 469 F.3d 768 (9th Cir. 
2006); Quechan Tribe of the Fort Yuma Reservation v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 
755 F. Supp. 2d 1104 (S.D. Cal. 2010). 
225. See Miller, supra note 207, at *16 (suggesting possibility that 
Quechan Tribe “will be seen as an outlier because of the strict requirements and 
close scrutiny the court imposed on the BLM”). 
226. Wyoming, 2015 WL 5845145, *15 (considering the consultation 
argument under standard for preliminary injunction requiring consideration of the 
likelihood of success on the merits and without a full administrative record). 
227. Id. 
228. Id. at *17 (emphasis in original). 
229. Id. 
230. Id. (citations omitted). 
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The district court’s findings on tribal consultation were based 
only upon the standards for a preliminary injunction, which were argued 
by the parties with the benefit of an entire administrative record.231 In 
addition, the federal and intervenor defendants have each appealed the 
court’s preliminary injunction and the federal appellants have argued that 
their own consultation policies are not legally binding.232 Although the 
viability of the district court’s initial assessment of the BLM’s adequacy 
of tribal consultation in preparing the Final Rule is, at best, uncertain, it 
underscores the legitimacy of the tribal concerns over the consultation 
process expressed throughout the BLM’s rulemaking. 
At a minimum, the timing of the BLM’s consultation outreach to 
tribes supports reconsideration of the Final Rule as it applies to tribes. In 
developing its approach to regulations regarding fracking, the Agency 
first held one public forum and four public meetings in late 2010 and 
2011, then drafted the initial rule and only then used the subsequent 
tribal consultations to inform tribes of its efforts.233 This was a far cry 
from the drafting of the initial IMDA regulations, which were circulated 
to tribes and tribal interest groups and revised based on their comments 
prior to being available for any public comment.234 More recently, the 
BIA, when revising its regulations related to surface leases of Indian 
lands for residential, business, and renewable energy projects, distributed 
a preliminary copy of draft regulations for tribal comment and 
consultation, which the BIA considered and incorporated before 
subsequently publishing the initial proposed rule.235 Furthermore, unlike 
the BLM’s lack of willingness to significantly amend the Final Rule in 
response to tribal comments, the final structure and format of both the 
IMLA and the IMDA regulations, along with numerous substantive 
                                                 
231. Wyoming v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, No. 2:15-CV-043-SWS, slip 
op at *3 (D. Wyo. Dec. 17, 2015) (order den. mot. for final j. or stay of d. ct. 
proceedings pending appeal). The issues are now fully briefed on the merits and, as 
this article goes to publication, the matter is before Judge Skavdahl for 
consideration.  
232. Opening Br. for the Fed. Appellants, supra note 112, at 48-49; 
Wyoming v. Dep’t. of the Interior, No. 15-8126 (10th Cir. filed Nov. 27, 2015); 
Wyoming v. Secretary Sally Jewell, No. 15-8134 (10th Cir. filed Dec. 15, 2015).  
233. 80 Fed. Reg. at 16,132. 
234. Mining Regulations, Proposed Rule, 48 Fed. Reg. 31,978 (June 15, 
1983); see supra Section III.B. 
235. Residential, Business, and Wind and Solar Resource Leases on 
Indian Land, Proposed Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. 73,784, 73,786 (Nov. 29, 2011); see infra 
Section V.C.ii. 
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changes, were largely the result of changes made in response to tribal 
input.236  
Beyond its shortcomings in comparison to prior regulatory 
drafting efforts, the BLM’s tribal consultation also failed to align with 
the Agency’s mandates. Although Secretarial Order 3317 was issued 
between the time of the public meetings and the initiation of tribal 
consultations, the BLM was still bound by Executive Order 13,175 and 
President Obama’s 2009 Presidential Memorandum, both of which 
encourage early and meaningful tribal consultation. By failing to engage 
tribes in conjunction with its public outreach efforts in 2010 and 2011, 
the BLM eliminated any opportunity for tribes to help shape the direction 
of the Final Rule and, whether fairly or unfairly, created the perception 
that the rule was responsive to general public concerns and that tribal 
concerns were secondary. The subsequent failure of the BLM to separate 
tribal issues from the broader public lands application of the Final Rule 
further compounded this perception, rendering the Agency’s follow-up 
attempts to consult with tribes essentially meaningless. As a result, the 
tribal consultation process that led to the Final Rule fell short of existing 
consultation standards and is even less sufficient when viewed in 
comparison to the efforts of the DOI to promulgate its current IMLA and 
IMDA regulations over thirty years ago and the more recent efforts of the 
BIA.237  
Because the BLM’s tribal consultation was flawed from the start 
of the Final Rule’s promulgation, the Agency would be well-served to 
                                                 
236. See supra Section III.B.  
237. See id.; infra Section V.C.ii. The BLM’s tribal consultation also 
pales in comparison to the emerging international law concept of free, prior and 
informed consent. See Miller, supra note 207, at *29-45. As it relates to tribal 
consultation, the concept is most clearly embodied in Article 19 of the 2007 United 
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, which requires that 
“[s]tates shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous peoples 
concerned through their own representative institutions in order to obtain their free, 
prior and informed consent before adopting and implementing legislative or 
administrative measures that may affect them.” United Nations Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples, A/RES/61/259 art. XIX (Oct. 2, 2007), available at 
http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/DRIPS_en.pdf. In announcing that 
the United States supports the UNDRIP, President Obama noted that “Washington 
can’t – and shouldn’t – dictate a policy agenda for Indian Country. Tribal nations do 
better when they make their own decisions.” U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, ANNOUNCEMENT 
OF U.S. SUPPORT FOR THE UNITED NATIONS DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF 
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 2, available at 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/184099.pdf (last visited Feb. 23, 
2016). 
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return to the table with tribes, engage in detailed consultation regarding 
tribal concerns, which will vary from tribe to tribe, and reconsider the 
substance of the Final Rule as applied to Indian lands in light of those 
concerns. 
 
B.  Statutory Authority 
 
In crafting the Final Rule as applied to Indian lands, the BLM 
relied upon the general authority granted by the IMLA and the IMDA for 
the Secretary to promulgate regulations implementing those laws.238 
Supreme Court precedent allows federal agencies to exercise broad 
discretion in the drafting of regulations, provided the Agency acts within 
the bounds of its statutory authority.239 Even if the IMLA and the IMDA 
grant the BLM broad discretion in crafting fracking regulations, 
however, Congress specifically intended those acts to promote tribal 
sovereignty and economic development, which are considerations 
distinct from those relevant to the management of federal public lands. 
By failing to recognize this distinction, the BLM’s Final Rule fails to 
serve the interests intended by Congress to be promoted by the IMLA 
and the IMDA and is inconsistent with the purposes of the BLM’s 
statutory authority, if not the authority itself.  
 
1.  Purposes of the IMLA and the IMDA 
 
Just as the trust responsibility is rooted in historic decisions of 
the Supreme Court related to the federal relationship with Indian tribes, 
the Court is largely responsible for creating and recognizing Congress’ 
plenary authority over Indian affairs.240 The Court has upheld a variety of 
congressional actions related exclusively to Indian affairs, based on a 
broad reading of the Constitution’s Commerce Clause and a promotion 
of the inherent authority of the federal government to address sovereign 
matters, such as treaty making.241 Therefore, whether in exercise of the 
                                                 
238. E.g., 80 Fed. Reg. at 16,132. 
239. City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1868 (2013) (“[n]o 
matter how it is framed, the question a court faces when confronted with an agency's 
interpretation of a statute it administers is always, simply, whether the agency has 
stayed within the bounds of its statutory authority.”). 
240. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at §§ 501[4], 5.02[1], 389-
91. 
241. Id. § 5.01[4], 390-91 n.53. 
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federal trust responsibility or to terminate it,242 Congress has nearly 
universal authority to create federal law in order to address concerns 
specifically related to Indian Country.243 The IMLA and the IMDA are 
each examples of exercises of Congress’s plenary authority over Indian 
affairs in fulfillment of broader federal Indian policies. 
The IMLA was enacted in 1938, just four years after the 
adoption of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 (“IRA”).244 The IRA 
ended the disastrous allotment of tribal lands and, instead, sought to 
change the course of federal Indian policy through the reinvigoration of 
tribal self-government. In furtherance of that policy, the IRA authorized 
tribes to adopt tribal constitutions and charter corporations.245 The IRA 
also restored unallotted and unsettled tribal lands to federal protection on 
behalf of tribes.246 Although not every tribe viewed the IRA as 
supportive of traditional tribal government authority, the IRA reversed 
the course of the federal government’s prior assimilationist policies in 
favor of broader support for tribal governments.247  
As an extension of the IRA’s policies, the IMLA promoted tribal 
governmental authority by requiring tribal consent to mineral leases.248 
Congress also intended the IMLA to promote tribal economic 
development and, as a result, required the Secretary to utilize advertising 
and bidding procedures that would help ensure a positive economic 
return on IMLA leases.249 Although the Supreme Court has determined 
that the Secretary has no fiduciary responsibility to maximize tribal 
revenues as a result of these directives, in doing so the Court noted that 
imposing such a duty would be inconsistent (in the Court’s view) with 
the IMLA’s intent to promote tribal self-determination.250  
Congress’ passage of the IMDA expanded the authority and 
ability of tribes to negotiate various types of agreements to pursue energy 
                                                 
242. See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588 (codified as 18 U.S.C. § 
1162, 28 U.S.C. § 1360, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-1326 (2012)). 
243. See, e.g., Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565-68 (1903); 
United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371, 412-16 (1980). 
244. 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (2012). 
245. Id. §§ 476, 477. 
246. Id. § 463(a). 
247. COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at § 1.05, 82-83. 
248. 25 U.S.C. § 396a.  
249. 25 U.S.C. § 396b (requiring advertisement of leases and 
consideration of the ‘highest qualified bidder”, subject to consideration by the 
Secretary of whether awarding a lease to such bidder would be in Indian’s best 
interests or consent by the Indians to a privately negotiated lease). 
250. United States v. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488, 508 (2003). 
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development.251 These agreements, including joint ventures, operating, 
production sharing, service or other agreements, sought to enhance tribal 
participation and involvement in mineral development beyond simply 
acting as a passive lessor under the IMLA.252 This flexibility was 
intended “‘first, to further the policy of self-determination and second, to 
maximize the financial return tribes can expect for their valuable mineral 
resources.’”253  
Similarly, the IMDA required that the Secretary consider the best 
interests of a tribe when reviewing a proposed IMDA agreement, 
including economic, environmental, and other factors.254 Consideration 
of these tribal interests may also help the Secretary fulfill her statutory 
duty to advise a tribe about the viability of a potential IMDA agreement 
during negotiation of that agreement by the tribe.255 While the IMDA’s 
statutory mandates and corresponding regulatory requirements may 
appear to create legally enforceable responsibilities for the Secretary, the 
IMDA also specifically waives the liability of the United States for 
“losses sustained by a tribe or individual Indian” under an IMDA 
agreement approved by the Secretary.256 By excusing the United States 
from liability for an IMDA deal that results in losses to a tribe, the 
waiver recognizes the greater potential for risk posed by the variety of 
agreements authorized by the IMDA and the tribal role in negotiating 
those agreements.257 In both the IMLA and the IMDA, therefore, 
Congress considered the challenges facing Indian Country, specifically 
the need to promote and support tribal authority and economic 
development, and passed legislation expressly aimed at those purposes.  
 
2.  Purposes of FLPMA 
 
While the BLM cited the IMLA and the IMDA as authority 
supporting the promulgation of the Final Rule and its application to 
Indian lands, the Agency also proposed amending its existing regulations 
to incorporate FLPMA as separate authority supporting the Agency’s 
                                                 
251. 25 U.S.C. § 2102. 
252. Id.  
253. Quantum Exploration, Inc. v. Clark, 780 F.2d 1457, 1458 (9th Cir. 
1986) (quoting S. REP. NO. 97-472, at 2 (1982)).  
254. 25 U.S.C. § 2103(b). 
255. Id. § 2106; see also Quantum Exploration, 780 F.2d at 1460-61. 
256. 25 U.S.C. § 2103(e). 
257. See Royster, supra note 73, at 591 (“[t]he intent of the hold-
harmless provision is that if tribes wish to become partners in development, then 
tribes must take the risk of loss.”) 
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application of the rule to federal lands.258 Like the IMLA and the IMDA, 
FLPMA demonstrates congressional intent to establish specific standards 
for management of natural resources by the Secretary. Unlike the 
Secretary’s duties to fulfill Congress’ intent to promote tribal self-
determination and economic development, however, FLPMA provides 
that the Secretary must manage the “public lands under principles of 
multiple use and sustained yield.”259 Congress further required that the 
Secretary shall, “[i]n managing the public lands . . . by regulation or 
otherwise, take any action necessary to prevent unnecessary or undue 
degradation of the lands.”260 Congress’ policy in doing so was to ensure 
that the public lands would be managed to “protect the quality of 
scientific, scenic, historical, ecological, environmental, air and 
atmospheric, water resource, and archaeological values” but also to 
recognize the “[n]ation’s need for domestic sources of minerals.”261 The 
Supreme Court has recognized that FLPMA’s use of the “deceptively 
simple term,” “multiple use management” therefore results in “the 
enormously complicated task of striking a balance among the many 
competing uses to which land can be put.”262 Although the nature of this 
balance can swing from development-oriented to more conservation-
minded depending upon the political winds that blow, the interests that 
Congress demanded the Secretary to serve under FLPMA are those of 
the public, not Indian tribes. The balance to be weighed in managing the 
public lands, therefore, largely excludes tribal interests of the type 
specifically promoted by the IMLA and the IMDA in the management of 
Indian lands.263 
The treatment of tribal interests in the management of federal 
lands demonstrates the distinction between public and tribal interests. 
Often, conflict arises over the “multiple use” of such lands by the public 
                                                 
258. 80 Fed. Reg. at 16,141, 16,217. 
259. 43 U.S.C. § 1732(a).  
260. Id. § 1732(b). 
261. Id. § 1701(8), (12). 
262. Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 58 (2004). 
263. In summarizing the statutory authority supporting the Final Rule, 
BLM Director Neil Kornze told a House Subcommittee that “[o]n net, this statutory 
regime requires the BLM to balance responsible development with protection of the 
environment and public safety.” Bureau of Land Management’s Final Hydraulic 
Fracturing Rule, supra note 104 (statement of Neil Kornze, Dir., Bureau of Land 
Mgmt., at 2-3), available at 
http://naturalresources.house.gov/uploadedfiles/kornzetestimony.pdf. Although he 
mentioned the IMLA, Kornze did not suggest that the Agency also needed to 
consider tribal self-determination or economic development. 
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and the desire of many tribes to maintain cultural and spiritual 
connections to their ancestral homelands and the sacred sites thereon, of 
which many tribes have been dispossessed.264 Professor Rebecca Tsosie 
has forcefully argued for a broader interpretation of the Indian trust 
doctrine in this context, noting that although “Native peoples’ rights are 
often not differentiated in any meaningful way from the interests of other 
‘stakeholders’” in the process of federal agency decision-making, those 
rights “must be differentiated from their rights as separate nations that 
have a trust relationship with the United States government.”265 On this 
basis, Professor Tsosie maintains that where conflicts arise over the use 
of federal lands outside of Indian Country, “future solutions must 
respond to the cultural distinctiveness of Native nations, as well as their 
unique political status within the domestic federal system.”266 While 
these considerations are largely ignored in the management of public 
lands, the congressional purposes behind the IMLA and the IMDA 
promote a different and more Indian trust oriented regulatory approach to 
Indian lands than FLPMA did for federal lands. Nonetheless, in 
promulgating the Final Rule, the BLM conflated its public land 
management responsibilities under FLPMA with its regulatory authority 
under the IMLA and IMDA. 
The BLM did not distinguish between Indian and federal public 
lands under the Final Rule or in its proposed application. In justifying 
this decision, the BLM noted that its existing regulations applied to both 
types of land and that it viewed its obligations to tribes as requiring that 
their lands be protected to the same degree as public lands.267 While 
                                                 
264. Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Prot. Ass’n., 485 U.S. 439, 451 
(1988) (citation omitted) (denying First Amendment claims of tribal members and 
associations asserted against the building of a road through an area of historical 
occupation and spiritual significance, the effect of which would “‘virtually destroy 
the . . . Indians’ ability to practice their religion’”); Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest 
Serv., 535 F. 3d 1058, 1063 (10th Cir. 2008) (denying that the spraying of treated 
sewage water on the San Francisco Peaks of Arizona, considered sacred by many 
local tribes and their members, would amount to a substantial burden on the exercise 
of their religion because such use of water would only affect their “subjective 
spiritual experience.”) 
265. Rebecca Tsosie, The Conflict between the ‘Public Trust’ and the 
‘Indian Trust’ Doctrines: Federal Public Land Policy and Native Nations, 39 TULSA 
L. REV. 271, 300 (2003).  
266. Id. at 310. 
267. See, e.g., 80 Fed. Reg. at 16,129 (“[l]ike other BLM regulations, this 
final rule applies to oil and gas operations on public lands . . . , as well as operations 
on Indian lands, to ensure that these lands and communities all receive the same 
level of protection as provided on public lands.”). 
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acknowledging that the BLM could allow for separate regulations and 
regulatory oversight of tribal lands, the BLM felt its uniform approach 
was “more economic” than creating a parallel regulatory scheme within 
the BIA.268 In addition, the BLM acknowledged that both state and tribal 
regulations may apply in conjunction with the Final Rule and allowed a 
process for considering specific variances to the Final Rule for both so 
long as those regulations were as stringent as the Final Rule’s 
requirements.269 While claiming to respect the federal policy of tribal 
self-determination, the BLM viewed tribal governmental authority on the 
same basis as state governments and largely ignored the uniquely tribal 
interests promoted by the IMLA and the IMDA. 
Similarly, although the Agency evaluated the economic impacts 
of the Final Rule on tribes and concluded that the rule “poses an 
incremental cost of about $10 million per year” across Indian Country, 
the BLM did not analyze whether or how that additional incremental cost 
may impact tribal economic development as intended under the IMLA 
and the IMDA.270 Instead, the BLM suggested that increased regulatory 
costs were just part of doing business on federal and Indian lands.271 In 
addition, the BLM focused only on the potential effects of the Final Rule 
itself, stating that “[t]he rule would not render Indian lands more or less 
attractive than Federal lands.”272 This narrow focus ignored the 
significant difference between the need for tribes to develop their 
homelands and economies and the much less critical economic pressures 
applicable to management of the public lands.273 The myopic treatment 
of Indian and federal lands further overlooked applicability of the Final 
Rule in the context of express congressional intent to promote tribal 
economic development and failed to acknowledge the existing regulatory 
                                                 
268. Id. at 16,185. 
269. Id. at 16,221 (proposed 43 C.F.R. § 3162.3-3(k)). 
270. Id. at 16,206-07. Industry groups have claimed the agency vastly 
underestimated the actual costs of the Final Rule; however, because the Rule is yet 
to be implemented, the exact costs of compliance are yet to be determined. See 
Michelle Ye Hee Lee, You Can’t Trust the Numbers on the New Fracking Regs, 
WASH. POST (Mar. 30, 2015), available at 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2015/03/30/you-cant-trust-
the-numbers-on-the-new-fracking-regs/. 
271. 80 Fed. Reg. at 16,212. 
272. Id. at 16,185. 
273. See, e.g., Bruce R. Huber, The Fair Market Value of Public 
Resources, 103 CAL. L. REV. 1515 (2015) (outlining the challenges and failures of 
the federal government to obtain fair market value for public resources in various 
contexts). 
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environment applicable to Indian lands, which, as the GAO recently 
reported, already creates significant barriers to development.274  
Therefore, although the BLM enjoyed broad discretion in 
promulgating the Final Rule, in exercise of that discretion, it overlooked 
or discounted specific Congressional interests supporting tribal 
sovereignty and economic development in favor of a uniform regulatory 
scheme applicable to both Indian and federal lands. In doing so, the 
Agency ignored “considerations governing the administration of Indian-
owned resources [that] are different from those involved in administering 
the public estate”—the very same considerations that Secretary of the 
Interior Thomas S. Kleppe relied on nearly forty years ago to call for 
revisions to the DOI’s coal mining regulations.275 New rulemaking that, 
while incorporating a meaningful tribal consultation process, is also more 
sensitive to these specific and substantive tribal considerations would be 
more faithful to congressional intent. 
 
C.  Trust Responsibility 
 
Just as the Final Rule is inconsistent with the statutory purposes 
supporting the IMLA and the IMDA, it is also out of step with recent 
congressional actions related to energy development and rulemakings of 
other agencies regarding the management of tribal natural resources. In 
each of these areas, Congress and the BIA have sought to carry out their 
trust responsibility through the promotion of tribal authority rather than 
the expansion of federal oversight. 
 
1.  Congressional Action Regarding Indian Energy Development 
 
Although the self-determination era is now nearly fifty years on 
from President Nixon’s message, the federal government continues to 
refine its approach to supporting and encouraging tribal self-
determination. Through this evolution, the federal trust responsibility can 
be seen less as a duty to oversee and protect tribes and instead as an 
obligation to foster and encourage tribal sovereignty. This approach has 
been especially apparent with regard to recent enactments authorizing 
greater tribal management of energy and surface resources. 
The ITEDSDA, passed in 2005, authorizes a tribe to negotiate 
and enter into a TERA with the Secretary that would allow the tribe to 
                                                 
274. GAO-15-502, supra note 98. 
275. Mining on Indian Lands: Mineral Development Contracts, Proposed 
Rules, 42 Fed. Reg. 18,083 (Mar. 30, 1977). 
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approve energy related leases, rights-of-way and other agreements for 
projects on Indian lands without secretarial approval. To do so, a tribe 
must demonstrate sufficient capacity for the oversight of such 
agreements and develop an approval process that includes an opportunity 
for and responds to public input.276 In addition, the ITEDSDA waives 
any liability of the federal government resulting from any negotiated 
term of any agreement approved by a tribe pursuant to a TERA.277 This 
waiver of liability, which is similar to but narrower than the waiver of 
federal liability under the IMDA, recognizes that the federal government 
is not responsible for the consummation of any agreement entered into 
by a tribe under its own authority pursuant to a TERA. While some have 
argued that the waiver of liability and elimination of federal oversight of 
energy-related agreements amounts to a reduction of the federal trust 
responsibility,278 the ITEDSDA’s broader policy of enhancing tribal 
governance and regulatory structures, albeit subject to certain conditions, 
demonstrates a shift away from the conception of the trust responsibility 
as mandating only federal oversight and protection of tribal resources. 
This shift was further emphasized in the passage of the 
HEARTH Act in 2012. Like the ITEDSDA, the HEARTH Act empowers 
tribes to review and approve surface leases on their own lands without 
federal review and approval of each individual lease, provided the tribal 
process for doing so meets certain standards.279 In general, the tribe’s 
leasing regulations must be consistent with federal leasing regulations 
and, just like under a TERA, the tribe must provide an environmental 
review process similar to the NEPA process. The federal government is 
also excused from any liability associated with a tribally-approved 
lease.280 In addition, the HEARTH Act provides an opportunity to 
petition the Secretary for review of a tribe’s compliance with its 
regulations, provided tribal remedies have been exhausted.281  
                                                 
276. 25 U.S.C. § 3504(e)(2)(c). For an analysis of ITEDSDA’s place 
along the evolution of tribal control over mineral development and discussion of its 
downsides, see Judith Royster, Practical Sovereignty, Political Sovereignty, and the 
Indian Tribal Energy Development and Self-Determination Act, 12 LEWIS & CLARK 
L. REV. 1065 (2008). 
277. 25 U.S.C. § 3504(e)(6)(D)(ii).  
278. Elizabeth Ann Kronk, Tribal Energy Resource Agreements: The 
Unintended ‘Great Mischief for Indian Energy Development’ and the Resulting Need 
for Reform, 29 PACE ENVT’L. L. REV. 811, 845-48 (2012). 
279. 25 U.S.C. § 415(h). 
280. Id. 
281. Id. 
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As with the ITEDSDA, these requirements have generated 
criticism of the diminished federal role in protecting tribal resources;282 
however, the DOI offered tribes significant assistance in taking 
advantage of the HEARTH Act. For example, the BIA prepared a 
checklist,283 provided a national policy memorandum setting forth 
detailed guidance,284 and created a largely transparent review and 
approval process for proposed tribal regulations.285 As a result, unlike the 
ITEDSDA, pursuant to which no tribe has yet entered a TERA, over 
twenty tribes are now reviewing and approving surface leases for their 
own lands without federal involvement under the HEARTH Act.286 
Although neither would displace the BLM’s Final Rule,287 both 
the ITEDSDA and the HEARTH Act demonstrate the ongoing evolution 
of federal efforts to refocus the trust responsibility away from federal 
oversight and toward the promotion of tribal authority. These two 
examples are particularly relevant in comparison to the BLM’s Final 
Rule because they demonstrate specific support for increased tribal 
regulatory authority over development on Indian lands. Unlike the 
ITEDSDA and the HEARTH Act, the Final Rule increases the federal 
role in review and approval of development activities on Indian lands 
without any opportunity to promote the tribal regulatory role. Although 
the BLM sought to emphasize that the Final Rule would not interfere or 
preempt tribal regulations and that the Rule’s variance process allowed 
the Agency to consider whether tribal regulations could apply in limited 
instances, the Final Rule itself does not allow for the assumption of any 
                                                 
282. Elizabeth Ann Kronk Warner, Tribal Renewable Energy 
Development under the HEARTH Act: an Independently Rational but Collectively 
Deficient Option, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 1031 (2013) (criticizing the HEARTH Act’s 
waiver of federal liability and mandated environmental review process as erosive of 
both tribal sovereignty and the federal trust responsibility). 
283. U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, INDIAN AFFS., SAMPLE CHECKLIST FOR 
REGULATIONS SUBMITTED UNDER THE HEARTH ACT, available at 
http://www.indianaffairs.gov/cs/groups/xots/documents/document/idc1-032154.pdf 
(last visited Feb. 15, 2015). 
284. U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFS., NATIONAL 
POLICY MEMORANDUM: GUIDANCE FOR THE APPROVAL OF TRIBAL LEASING 
REGULATIONS UNDER THE HEARTH ACT, NPM-TRUS-29 (Jan. 16, 2013) available 
at http://www.indianaffairs.gov/cs/groups/public/documents/text/ 
idc1-026788.pdf. 
285. Bureau of Indian Aff., HEARTH Act of 2012, U.S. DEP’T OF THE 
INTERIOR, http://www.indianaffairs.gov/WhoWeAre/BIA/OTS/HEARTH 
/index.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2015). 
286. Id. 
287. See supra notes 190, 191. 
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additional regulatory authority by tribes.288 In fact, by adopting a rule 
that provides comprehensive federal standards and requirements that 
apply in addition to any existing or yet to be adopted tribal standards, the 
Final Rule dis-incentivizes tribal regulation of fracking, particularly in 
light of the delays caused by the existing federal role in tribal energy 
development.289 Therefore, rather than promote tribal authority over 
tribal lands as Congress has done in the ITEDSDA and the HEARTH 
Act, the Final Rule discourages tribes from regulating fracking on their 
own. 
 
2.  Agency Rulemaking 
 
Congress is not alone in its commitment to expanded federal 
deference to tribal decision-making. Recent updates by the BIA of its 
leasing and right-of-way regulations, which were proceeding 
contemporaneously with the BLM’s development of the Final Rule, 
demonstrate increased agency recognition for and respect of tribal 
authority as well. 
In February 2011, the BIA released to tribes for review and 
comment a preliminary draft revision to the BIA’s regulations regarding 
tribal surface leases, found at 25 C.F.R. part 162.290 After consulting with 
tribes on the draft revisions at various tribal meetings and requesting and 
reviewing written comments on the preliminary draft, the BIA published 
a proposed rule in November 2011.291 The proposed rule acknowledged 
that secretarial approval of surface leases remained a statutory 
requirement (the rule was proposed prior to passage of the HEARTH 
Act) but sought to streamline and make the approval process more 
efficient.292 To do so, the BIA proposed eliminating the need to approve 
permits, certain subleases, and assignments; requiring a timeline for its 
approval; and limiting the bases on which it could refuse to approve 
amendments, assignments, and other lease-related agreements.293 
Importantly, the proposed rule also eliminated the requirement that the 
BIA ensure that the tribal lessee secure fair market value for the lease 
                                                 
288. 80 Fed Reg. at 16,185 (“[a] variance [if granted in BLM’s sole and 
un-appealable discretion] would not necessarily adopt tribal regulations as the 
Federal rule.”) 
289. GAO-15-502, supra note 98. 
290. 76 Fed. Reg. at 73,786. 
291. Id.  
292. Id. at 73,784-85 (describing various changes to make regulations 
more efficient and transparent). 
293. Id. at 73,785. 
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and replaced it with a provision deferring to the tribal lessee’s 
negotiation of the value of the lease unless the tribe requests a fair 
market valuation.294 The proposed rule also required the BIA to comply 
with tribal law295 and allowed the Secretary to waive any provisions of 
the draft regulations that conflicted with tribal law, subject to certain 
limitations.296 
In general, tribal reaction to the proposed rule was positive, as 
the BIA noted in publishing a revised rule as the final leasing rule in 
December 2012.297 Even so, in response to a tribal comment urging 
greater deference to tribes in financial matters, the BIA “reviewed the 
regulation to ensure that the final rule requires BIA to defer to tribes in 
all possible cases, consistent with our trust responsibility.”298 Therefore, 
the final leasing rule maintained the BIA’s deference to tribal law and the 
preamble to the rule explained that the “BIA will defer to tribal law in 
decisions regarding leases beyond just the approval decision.”299  
Similarly, the final leasing rule incorporated a new section 
specifically addressing the taxability of improvements, activities, and 
leasehold interests on leased Indian land.300 This new section built upon 
language of the proposed rule and emphasized the federal and tribal 
interests in leasing Indian lands which, according to established Supreme 
Court precedent, should tip the balance away from state taxation of non-
Indian interests in leased Indian lands.301 In doing so, the preamble to the 
                                                 
294. Id. at 73,798 (proposed section 162.320). 
295. Id. at 73,794 (proposed section 162.014). 
296. Id. (proposed section 162.013) (the Secretary would be prohibited 
from waiving a regulatory provision in favor of tribal law if such waiver would 
violate a federal statute or judicial decision or “conflict with the United States’ trust 
responsibility under Federal law.”) 
297. Residential, Business, and Wind and Solar Resource Leases on 
Indian Land, Final Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. 72,439, 72,442 (Dec. 5, 2012) (“[t]ribes stated 
that they supported the steps BIA took in the proposed rule to recognize tribal 
sovereignty and tribes’ achievements in terms of their ability to manage their own 
affairs on critical leasing issues. Tribes were particularly supportive of provisions for 
tribal waiver of appraisals, deadlines for BIA action, and BIA’s deference to the 
Indian landowners’ determination that the lease is in their best interest.”) 
298. Id. (emphasis added). 
299. Id. at 72,446. Like the proposed version of the leasing rule, the final 
leasing rule allowed for tribal law to supersede or modify the regulations where the 
tribe notified the BIA of the superseding or modifying effect, it would not violate 
otherwise applicable federal law, and the superseding or modification of the 
regulation would apply only on tribal land. Id. § 162.014, 72,472. 
300. Id. § 162.017, 72,447. 
301. Id. (citing White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448, U.S. 136, 
143 (1980) (courts must conduct a particularized inquiry of state, federal and tribal 
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final leasing rule expressly stated the purposes for the rule as 
“promot[ing] Indian housing and . . . allow[ing] Indian landowners to use 
their land profitably for economic development, ultimately contributing 
to tribal well-being and self-government.”302 Increases in project costs, 
such as the imposition of state and local taxes, would frustrate this latter 
purpose and the BIA specifically noted the unique impact of such 
increased costs on tribes, who face significant challenges in attracting 
capital investment in the first place.303 The BIA viewed the rule as 
further promoting tribal sovereignty and self-government through the 
regulations by ensuring that the final leasing rule required “significant 
deference, to the maximum extent possible, to tribal determinations that a 
lease provision or requirement is in [the tribe’s] best interest.”304  
The BIA’s approach to its trust responsibility in the final leasing 
regulations stands in marked contrast to how the BLM considered its 
responsibilities to tribes in its revised proposed rule, even though both 
agencies were developing their rules during the same timeframe.305 
Where the BIA’s final leasing rule viewed deference to tribes “in all 
possible cases” as consistent with its trust responsibility, the BLM’s 
revised proposed rule contemplated the trust responsibility as 
interchangeable with the Secretary’s responsibility to prevent undue or 
unnecessary degradation of public lands.306 Where the BIA’s final 
leasing rule allowed a tribe to notify the Secretary that its own tribal 
rules will supersede or modify the federal regulations, provided such 
tribal rules would not violate otherwise applicable federal law, the 
BLM’s revised proposed rule only allowed tribes to request limited 
                                                                                                             
interests to determine the authority of a state to tax non-Indian activity on a 
reservation)). 
302. Id. (emphasis added). 
303. Id. at 72,448 (“[i]ncreased project costs can impede a tribe’s ability 
to attract non-Indian investment to Indian lands where such investment and 
participation are critical to the vitality of tribal economies. An increase in project 
costs is especially damaging to economic development on Indian lands given the 
difficulty Indian tribes and individuals face in securing access to capital.”) 
304. Id. 
305. The BIA’s final leasing rule became effective on January 4, 2013, 
less than five months before the BLM issued the revised version of its initial 
proposed fracking rule. Compare 77 Fed. Reg. at 72,440, with 78 Fed. Reg. at 
31,636. Thus, presumably the BLM was drafting the revised proposed rule as the 
BIA finalized its leasing regulations. 
306. Compare 77 Fed. Reg. at 72,442 (BIA final leasing rule), with 78 
Fed. Reg. at 31,644 (BLM’s proposed revised rule, stating that the “revised 
regulation prevents undue or unnecessary degradation of public lands and furthers 
the Secretary’s trust responsibilities on Indian lands.”) 
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variances from its provisions and required that any such variance be 
approved by the BLM, subject only to the Agency’s own discretion.307 
Similarly, while the BIA’s final leasing rule sought to enhance the ability 
of tribes to use their lands “profitably for economic development” in 
light of the “especially damaging” impact of increased project costs on 
tribes,308 the BLM acknowledged that its revised proposed rule would 
increase the administrative delays and costs for those seeking to develop 
tribal lands, making those lands potentially less attractive than state or 
private lands not subject to such additional administrative burdens.309 
Ignoring the BIA’s sensitivity to the challenges of tribal economic 
development, the BLM instead viewed the increased costs created by the 
revised proposed rule as an ordinary cost of doing business.310 
Less than two years after finalizing its revised leasing rules and 
nearly a year prior to publication of the BLM’s Final Rule, the BIA also 
embarked on an effort to revise its outdated regulations governing the 
process for its review and approval of rights-of-way across Indian 
lands.311 In doing so, the BIA noted that the revision of the right-of-way 
regulations was prompted by the supportive responses it received to the 
final leasing rule and that it sought to revise the right-of-way regulations 
in a similar manner.312 As a result, the proposed right-of-way rule 
included similar provisions deferring to tribal decision-making regarding 
compensation,313 promoting the applicability of tribal laws and 
authority,314 and recognizing the exclusion of state tax authority over 
permanent improvements,315 activities,316 or interests in a right-of-way.317 
Each of these provisions were carried over into the final right-of-way 
                                                 
307. Compare 77 Fed. Reg. at § 162.014, 72,472, with 78 Fed. Reg. at 
31,677 (proposed section 3162.3-3(k)).  
308. 77 Fed. Reg. at 72,447-48. 
309. 78 Fed. Reg. at 31,670 (“[t]he BLM is aware that the revised 
proposed rule would nonetheless result in some higher costs for operators on Federal 
and Indian lands, compared with compliance costs for hydraulic fracturing on non-
Federal, non-Indian lands in several States.”). 
310. Id. (“[r]egulatory compliance costs, however, are only one set in a 
long list of costs that operators compare to anticipated revenues when deciding 
whether and how much to bid on a Federal or Indian lease.”) 
311. Rights-of-Way on Indian Land, 79 Fed. Reg. 34,455 (June 11, 
2014). 
312. Id. 
313. Id. § 169.109(a), 34.467. 
314. Id. § 169.008, 34,464. 
315. Id. § 169.009(a), 34,464. 
316. Id. § 169.009(b), 34,464. 
317. Id. § 169.009(c), 34,464. 
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rule.318 The first section of the revised regulations will now make explicit 
the BIA’s intent “to support tribal self-determination and self-governance 
by acknowledging and incorporating tribal law and policies in processing 
a request for a right-of-way across tribal lands and defer to the maximum 
extent possible to Indian landowner decisions regarding their Indian 
land.”319 Such support for tribal sovereignty is quite different from the 
BLM’s determination that the trust responsibility prevented any 
deference to tribal decisions regarding their own fracking regulations.320 
According to the BLM, the Final Rule’s limited recognition of tribal 
regulations through the possibility of a variance, which “would not 
necessarily adopt tribal regulations as the federal rule,” ensures that the 
Final Rule “accords with tribal self-determination to the extent that could 
be expected from a rule governing hydraulic fracturing operations.”321  
The BLM’s view of its trust responsibility and the interplay of 
that responsibility with tribal sovereignty and self-determination is 
inconsistent with how Congress encouraged tribal authority through the 
ITEDSDA and the HEARTH Act and particularly incongruent with the 
BIA’s approach to regulatory oversight of leasing and rights-of-ways on 
Indian land. In each of the statutory and regulatory examples discussed 
herein, either Congress or the BIA developed an approach to the federal 
government’s role in administering its responsibilities to tribes and 
Indian lands that specifically accounted for and promoted tribal 
sovereign interests, including both governmental and economic 
development concerns. Each of these efforts either pre-dated or was 
contemporaneous with the BLM’s promulgation of its Final Rule; 
however, rather than fashion its Final Rule in a similar manner, the BLM 
elevated uniformity of regulation across both federal and Indian lands to 
its highest priority. This approach does not correspond with the current 
                                                 
318. Rights-of-Way on Indian Land, 80 Fed. Reg. 72,492 (Nov. 19, 
2015). After initially scheduling the new regulations to take effect in December 
2015, the BIA twice postponed their effective date. See, e.g., Rights-of-Way on 
Indian Land, 80 Fed. Reg. 79,258 (Dec. 21, 2015) (extending effective date of the 
final right-of-way rule from December 21, 2015, to March 21, 2016); Rights-of-Way 
on Indian Land, 81 Fed. Reg. 14,976 (Mar. 21, 2016) (extending effective date until 
April 21, 2016 and the compliance date “for submission of documentation of past 
assignments” until August 16, 2016). 
319. 80 Fed. Reg. at 72,535. 
320. 80 Fed. Reg. at 16,185 (the Secretary would fail to fulfill her trust 
responsibility “if the BLM failed to implement the final rule because a tribe was 
implementing its own program.”) 
321. Id. 
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migration of federal policy and rulemaking away from federal 
paternalism and toward greater tribal self-determination.322  
 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
 
The BLM’s efforts to regulate fracking on both federal and 
Indian lands resulted in a nearly five year process that produced the Final 
Rule, only to have the Rule preliminarily enjoined by the Wyoming 
District Court, which was concerned about the Agency’s statutory 
authority to regulate fracking, the need for the rule, and the BLM’s tribal 
consultation process.323 While that litigation portends a judicial 
resolution of the debate over regulatory authority between the federal 
government and states as a matter of federalism, the BLM’s view of its 
trust responsibility to Indian tribes and its lack of meaningful deference 
to tribal sovereignty and self-determination are not likely to garner 
significant judicial scrutiny.324 Provided the BLM prevails in its 
argument that the IMLA and the IMDA are a statutory basis for the Final 
Rule,325 courts are likely to defer to the agency’s discretion in crafting 
                                                 
322. While not as directly comparable as the BIA’s leasing and right-of-
way regulations, recent efforts by other federal agencies have also demonstrated 
increasing sensitivity to and respect for tribal sovereignty and related issues. See, 
e.g., Revised Interpretation of Clean Water Act Tribal Provisions, 80 Fed. Reg. 
47,430 (Aug. 7, 2015) (EPA proposes reinterpretation of Clean Water Act Tribal 
Provision that would enhance EPA’s ability to authorize tribes to administer federal 
regulatory programs on their reservations); Gathering of Certain Plants or Plant Parts 
by Federally Recognized Indian Tribes for Traditional Purposes, 80 Fed. Reg. 
21,674 (Apr. 20, 2015) (National Park Service proposes regulations authorizing 
intergovernmental agreements between the federal and tribal governments to 
authorize tribal members to gather and remove plants used for traditional purposes 
from National Parks).  
323. Wyoming, 2015 WL 5845145. 
324. Although the Ute Indian Tribe argued that the Final Rule amounted 
to a breach of the BLM’s trust obligations to tribes, the District Court did not 
consider that argument in granting the preliminary injunction. Id.; Wyoming v. U.S. 
Dep’t of the Interior, No. 2:15-CV-043-SWS, slip op. at 4-9 (D. Wyo. June 22, 
2015) (mem. in support of TRO and prelim. inj.). 
325. Judge Skavdahl took a dim view of the BLM’s statutory authority 
for the Final Rule in preliminarily enjoining application of the Rule, although his 
order offered scant analysis of the IMLA and IMDA and, instead, focused primarily 
on whether any of the statutes on which the BLM relied granted the agency authority 
to regulate beyond surface impacts. Wyoming, 2015 WL 5845145, at *6 (noting that 
BLM failed to “cite any specific provision of the mineral leasing statutes authorizing 
regulation of this underground activity or regulation for the purpose of guarding 
against any incidental, underground environmental effects”) (emphasis added); Id. at 
*9-10 (also basing preliminary injunction on congressional decision to remove 
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the Final Rule within the bounds of that authority.326 Furthermore, the 
grounds on which a tribe could successfully claim that the federal trust 
responsibility creates a legally enforceable duty to craft regulations in a 
particular manner are quite narrow, particularly in light of the Supreme 
Court’s dim view of the Secretary’s responsibilities to tribes under the 
IMLA.327  
While neither the district court nor any appellate court may have 
the authority to force the BLM to reconsider the trust responsibility and 
re-craft the Final Rule to better accommodate tribal sovereign interests, 
this article demonstrates the need for the Agency to amend the Final Rule 
to exclude Indian lands from its application, return to the drafting table, 
re-initiate tribal consultation, and more carefully consider the appropriate 
exercise of its delegated regulatory authority over Indian lands. Such an 
approach would be more consistent with the BLM’s responsibilities to 
                                                                                                             
fracking from purview of SDWA, “[i]n determining whether Congress has spoken 
directly to the BLM's authority to regulate hydraulic fracturing under the [Mineral 
Leasing Act] or FLPMA, this Court cannot ignore the implication of Congress' 
fracking-specific legislation in the SDWA and [the 2005 Energy Policy Act].”) 
326. City of Arlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1868 (relying on Chevron U.S.A., 
Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 866 (1984) (the leading case 
on judicial deference to agency action, in which the Supreme Court stated “[w]hen a 
challenge to an agency construction of a statutory provision, fairly conceptualized, 
really centers on the wisdom of the agency’s policy, rather than whether it is a 
reasonable choice within a gap left open by Congress, the challenge must fail.”)). 
327. See Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. at 508 (denying money damages based 
on Navajo Nation’s claim that the Secretary breached a fiduciary duty created by the 
IMLA). Although the Navajo Nation claims were money damages claims, courts 
have failed to properly distinguish such claims from those seeking injunctive relief 
and have required that tribes demonstrate that Congress intended to create fiduciary 
duties through express statutory language, regardless of whether the tribe is seeking 
damages. See, e.g., El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. United States, 750 F.3d 863, 892 
(D.C. Cir. 2014) (a tribe’s challenge to agency action “failed to state a claim for 
relieve because the Tribe [did] not identif[y] a substantive source of law establishing 
specific fiduciary duties, a failure which is fatal to its trust claim regardless of 
whether we read the claim as brought under the [Administrative Procedures Act] or 
under a cause of action implied by the nature of the fiduciary relationship itself.”) 
(emphasis in original); COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at § 5.05[3][c], 430-432. 
Professor Mary Christina Wood artfully critiqued the improper conflation of these 
claims and called for the clarification of “the confused direction of the trust 
doctrine.” Mary Christina Wood, The Indian Trust Responsibility: Protecting Tribal 
Lands and Resources Through Claims of Injunctive Relief Against Federal Agencies, 
29 TULSA L. REV. 355, 367, 365-68 (2003). Notwithstanding the strength and 
accuracy of this argument; however, a tribe would likely face significant difficulty in 
convincing a federal judge that the trust responsibility limits the broad authority to 
promulgate regulations granted to the Secretary by the IMLA and the IMDA. 
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ensure timely and meaningful tribal consultation, could allow for a Final 
Rule that is more respectful of tribal sovereignty and economic 
development, and would allow the Agency to bring its conception of the 
trust responsibility more in line with the current direction of promoting 
tribal authority and decision-making. Withdrawing Indian lands from the 
Final Rule’s coverage would also provide the added benefit of limiting 
the bases on which the Final Rule could be challenged and would allow 
the BLM to focus on the statutory authority arguments raised by states 
challenging the Final Rule, without also having to defend its lackluster 
tribal consultation efforts. Lastly, there is precedent supporting 
reconsideration of the Final Rule in light of legitimate concerns raised 
even after its publication as a final rule.328  
The issues faced by the BLM both during and after the 
rulemaking process offer helpful lessons for federal agencies attempting 
to create rules that transcend the boundary between federal and Indian 
lands. First, any agency considering an issue that may impact tribes or 
tribal citizens would be well-served by engaging in substantive and 
meaningful tribal consultation early and often. The BLM’s failure to 
engage tribes in the same way that it reached out to the broader public set 
the wrong tone for the entire development of the Final Rule and 
ultimately provided one ground for preliminarily enjoining the Final 
Rule.329 Second, agencies would be wise to carefully consider the 
statutory foundations for their proposed actions and work to ensure that 
their regulations align with the intent behind those laws. By focusing on 
the need to protect Indian lands in the same manner as federal lands, the 
BLM crafted a Final Rule that minimized the promotion of tribal 
sovereignty and economic development, which were the express 
purposes of the IMLA and the IMDA on which the agency based its 
authority to apply the Final Rule to Indian lands. Finally, considering a 
proposed rulemaking within the broader context of the self-determination 
era and the evolving trust relationship would result in a regulatory 
approach that more closely aligns with tribal interests and the efforts of 
other agencies. BIA’s recent rulemakings demonstrate how an agency 
can exercise its discretion to craft appropriate regulations that fulfill the 
federal government’s trust responsibility by deferring to tribal decision-
making and promoting tribal sovereignty. Rather than follow the BIA’s 
                                                 
328.  The regulations implementing the IMLA and IMDA were initially 
published as final rules only to be withdrawn in response to concerns over their lack 
of clarity and the confusion caused by their treatment of tribal mineral development. 
61 Fed. Reg. 35,634 at 35,635. 
329. Wyoming, 2015 WL 5845145. 
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lead, however, the BLM developed the Final Rule with a commitment to 
an outdated and paternalistic view of the federal trust responsibility.  
Tribes expect more from their federal partners and the BLM 
should honor those expectations and work with Indian tribes within 
Indian Country to develop a new approach to regulating fracking that 
respects the boundary between federal and Indian lands. 
